Monthly Archives: July 2019

Have We No Decency? A Response to President Trump

The following statement was published on July 30, 2019 by the Washington National Cathedral. I reprint it here in its entirety with permission. There is nothing I can add to it except to say that it is past time for the rest of the true religious community to stand up and be counted on the issues addressed in this statement.

“The escalation of racialized rhetoric from the President of the United States has evoked responses from all sides of the political spectrum. On one side, African American leaders have led the way in rightfully expressing outrage. On the other, those aligned with the President seek to downplay the racial overtones of his attacks, or remain silent.

As faith leaders who serve at Washington National Cathedral ¬– the sacred space where America gathers at moments of national significance – we feel compelled to ask: After two years of President Trump’s words and actions, when will Americans have enough?

As Americans, we have had such moments before, and as a people we have acted. Events of the last week call to mind a similarly dark period in our history:

“Until this moment, Senator, I think I never really gauged your cruelty or your recklessness. … You have done enough. Have you no sense of decency?”

That was U.S. Army attorney Joseph Welch on June 9, 1954, when he confronted Senator Joseph McCarthy before a live television audience, effectively ending McCarthy’s notorious hold on the nation. Until then, under the guise of ridding the country of Communist infiltration, McCarthy had free rein to say and do whatever he wished. With unbridled speech, he stoked the fears of an anxious nation with lies; destroyed the careers of countless Americans; and bullied into submissive silence anyone who dared criticize him.

In retrospect, it’s clear that Welch’s question was directed less toward McCarthy and more to the nation as a whole. Had Americans had enough? Where was our sense of decency?

We have come to accept a level of insult and abuse in political discourse that violates each person’s sacred identity as a child of God. We have come to accept as normal a steady stream of language and accusations coming from the highest office in the land that plays to racist elements in society.

This week, President Trump crossed another threshold. Not only did he insult a leader in the fight for racial justice and equality for all persons; not only did he savage the nations from which immigrants to this country have come; but now he has condemned the residents of an entire American city. Where will he go from here?

Make no mistake about it, words matter. And, Mr. Trump’s words are dangerous.

These words are more than a “dog-whistle.” When such violent dehumanizing words come from the President of the United States, they are a clarion call, and give cover, to white supremacists who consider people of color a sub-human “infestation” in America. They serve as a call to action from those people to keep America great by ridding it of such infestation. Violent words lead to violent actions.

When does silence become complicity? What will it take for us all to say, with one voice, that we have had enough? The question is less about the president’s sense of decency, but of ours.

As leaders of faith who believe in the sacredness of every single human being, the time for silence is over. We must boldly stand witness against the bigotry, hatred, intolerance, and xenophobia that is hurled at us, especially when it comes from the highest offices of this nation. We must say that this will not be tolerated. To stay silent in the face of such rhetoric is for us to tacitly condone the violence of these words. We are compelled to take every opportunity to oppose the indecency and dehumanization that is racism, whether it comes to us through words or actions.

There is another moment in our history worth recalling. On January 21, 2017, Washington National Cathedral hosted an interfaith national prayer service, a sacred tradition to honor the peaceful transfer of political power. We prayed for the President and his young Administration to have “wisdom and grace in the exercise of their duties that they may serve all people of this nation, and promote the dignity and freedom of every person.”

That remains our prayer today for us all.

The Right Rev. Mariann Edgar BuddeBishop of the Episcopal Diocese of Washington
The Very Rev. Randolph Marshall HollerithDean of Washington National Cathedral
The Rev. Canon Kelly Brown DouglasCanon Theologian of Washington National Cathedral”

Source:  https://bit.ly/31dcWqp

 

Mueller Report Part II – Trump Guilty of Obstruction of Justice – F

F. The Inexplicable Treatment of Trump’s Personal Attorneys & Other Enablers

Another unexplained aspect of the Report relates to Trump’s use of his personal attorneys (never identified) to communicate with Flynn and his attorneys. Trump’s personal counsel appear a number of times in the report. II MR 121-122. A fair interpretation of this evidence is that Trump used his personal attorney to try to influence Flynn’s cooperation with the SCO, first with cajoling about how Trump cared about him, then with implied threats about Trump’s presumed anger. A further fair argument can be made that Trump’s personal counsel was a knowing participant in an obstruction effort. Why is this not at least mentioned in the Report?

The Report relegates to II MR-122, n. 839 the extraordinary decision not to try to interview Trump’s personal attorneys “because of attorney-client privilege issues.” Given the active role those lawyers played in some of Trump’s obstructive acts, it is hard to understand a decision not to try to learn something from them. Attorney-client privilege does not protect an attorney who is participating in a criminal enterprise. This is known as the crime-fraud exception to the general privilege rule. If Trump’s personal counsel were actively and knowingly participating in an attempt to obstruct justice by, for example, influencing Gen. Flynn’s testimony or by attempting to unlawfully procure the firing of the Special Counsel, the privilege likely does not apply. It is, moreover, inconceivable that Trump’s attorneys acted on their own without consulting their client. We are left to speculate as to why Mueller did not pursue this seemingly fruitful source of information.

We can’t be sure, of course, whether to credit Rick Gates assertion that Paul Manafort had talked with Trump’s personal counsel and been assured that they would be “taken care of” if they did not talk to the SCO. Mueller, however, clearly believed Gates’ account of these conversations with Manafort. II MR-123 & n. 848, 850. This is a subject that could have been pursued directly with Trump’s counsel if Mueller had been more aggressive in seeking the full body of evidence rather than simply assuming that the privilege would be upheld.

One of Trump’s personal attorneys during this period was Rudy Giuliani who gave multiple interviews in which he suggested Trump might pardon Manafort, then, following the classic Trump playbook, claimed he was misunderstood and not signaling anyone. II MR-124. This was fertile ground to discover whether Trump and Giuliani had mapped out this strategy to obtain Manafort’s silence or other forms of cooperation. A good argument could be made that Trump-Giuliani had waived the attorney-client privilege when Giuliani told the Washington Post that Trump had consulted his attorneys about granting pardons to Manafort. II MR-127. Manafort had some kind of joint defense agreement with Trump and was coordinating his Mueller interviews with Trump’s attorneys. II MR-127. That fact alone warranted taking Giuliani’s testimony under oath. It is all the more compelling because Trump publicly contradicting Giuliani’s statements. II MR-128. Instead, Mueller concludes that the evidence on Trump’s personal participation in all this was inconclusive (II MR-132), an amazing conclusion in light of his decision not to press for an interview of Giuliani and/or Trump.

Mueller digs deep to find alternative explanations for Trump’s comments about the treatment of Manafort. II MR-133. In the totality of circumstances regarding Trump’s repeated litany of claims that he and others were being treated unfairly, this is astonishing, especially considering that at times Trump claimed he knew very little about what these people did for him and the campaign. Normally you can’t have it both ways but Mueller lets Trump get away with it.

Note that there are substantial redactions in this part of the Report for Harm to an Ongoing Matter, suggesting that additional investigations have been farmed out to the US Attorneys’ offices. II MR 128-130.

Trump’s personal attorneys played a further role in Cohen’s false testimony to Congress. II MR-139. A joint defense agreement existed between Cohen and Trump plus other unnamed individuals involved in the Russia investigation. II MR-139. The identity of all the other individuals is not revealed in the Report. Why is this not addressed? The president’s personal attorney played an active role in assuring Cohen that his loyalty to Trump would be rewarded. II MR-140.

Despite the fact that drafts of Cohen’s false testimony to Congress were discussed with members of the Joint Defense Agreement and that false testimony to Congress under oath is a crime, Mueller did not see the drafts because of concerns about the common interest privilege. But it is not clear who raised those concerns. This is another example of Mueller seeming to act as counsel for the defense.

Perhaps because Cohen was in almost daily contact with Trump’s personal attorney about Cohen’s Congressional testimony, Mueller, in this one case, indicates an attempt was made to interview counsel. But the counsel declined, citing “potential privilege concerns.” II MR-143. What precisely those concerns were is not explained. Nor is there any indication that the SCO aggressively pursued this obviously important testimony about an agreement to suppress truthful information being sought by Congress. Who exactly is the “President’s personal counsel” that is referred here? Is it the same person throughout? Trump hired and replaced many attorneys during this time. Why does the SCO not identify these people by name?

This is not the normal or effective way to handle privilege disputes. The privilege-claiming party should be presented with the questions and compelled to explain with specificity why each question cannot be answered even in part because of privilege. Mueller may have gone through this exercise but there is no evidence of that anywhere in the Report.

Further puzzling issues arise from Mueller’s failure to pursue Robert Costello who, in the period following the raid on Cohen’s home and office, was used as a go-between connecting Giuliani and Cohen and assuring Cohen of Trump’s continued favor. II MR-146. Costello’s offering to support secret communications between the White House and Cohen appears to have been of no concern at the SCO. One question is which personal counsel to the President was assuring Cohen that if he continued lying, Trump would protect him? Why does Mueller protect the identity of President’s personal attorney engaged in a cover-up and overt acts of witness tampering/obstruction of justice?

 Beyond that, Mueller accepts that Trump’s personal counsel was working with Cohen on false testimony to Congress but does not attribute that conduct to Trump and never goes after the counsel for aiding & abetting false testimony or giving message to Cohen that he would be protected if he stuck to the party line. Why was Mueller so reticent about these compelling facts that do not appear to be disputed? Faced with an apparent conspiracy to submit false testimony to Congress, resistance by Trump & by his personal attorney (who refused to provide his version of his conversations with Cohen who was not his client and thus not covered by any plausible claim of privilege), Mueller simply assumed he couldn’t get evidence about Trump’s discussions with his personal counsel and didn’t even try to pursue this line. II MR-154. No presumption of privilege should attach to conspiracy to commit a crime. Mueller’s unwillingness to tangle with Trump’s personal attorneys is inexplicable and unconscionable malpractice. Why was Trump’s personal attorney not charged with suborning perjury in connection with Cohen’s false testimony that Trump’s personal attorney helped facilitate?

Mueller’s approach is particularly disturbing because Trump refused to answer the written questions posed to him about the Trump Tower meeting. II MR-149. What Trump did say was that he couldn’t remember his conversations with Cohen. After Cohen pled guilty to lying to Congress about the Trump Tower meeting, Trump refused to provide any more information about his role and turned sharply against Cohen. II MR-151. Thereafter, Giuliani made public statements that conflicted with what Trump was now saying, then “walked those back.” II MR-152. Mueller seems completely bamboozled by all this, unable to make the obvious conclusions.

Trump refused to clarify what Mueller calls the “seeming discrepancy” between his statements about the Trump Tower project in Russia made before and after Cohen’s guilty plea. Mueller engages repeatedly in speculation about what Trump might have meant rather than concluding that, having declined the opportunity to set the record straight, Trump should be estopped to deny the discrepancy and to deny what Cohen said was the truth eventually.

I have asked repeatedly in these evaluations of the Mueller Report why Trump’s enablers were not indicted. Mueller addresses very briefly at II MR-158 where he leaps a giant chasm of evidence to conclude that because a few of Trump’s aides refused to carry out his blatantly obstructive orders, virtually all of them were allowed to walk away unscathed, including Trump’s personal attorneys and others who, according to undisputed evidence, did carry out Trump’s orders to try to intimidate witnesses, terminate the SCO investigation and other forms of interference detailed throughout the Report. Mueller calls the “pattern” one in which Trump’s enablers resisted his obstruction directives, but the evidence adduced shows that in most cases the White House staff did exactly what Trump wanted them to do. The “pattern” is the exact opposite of Mueller’s conclusion.

The Mueller Report ends with a lengthy, lawyerly analysis of the statutory and constitutional defenses asserted by Trump’s attorneys. The analysis is unobjectionable and supports not only the conclusions Mueller did reach but re-emphasizes the lingering questions about the conclusions he declined to reach. In particular, we are left to wonder why so few of the obvious enablers of Trump’s overt obstructive acts were not held accountable. Mueller’s treatment of “presumption of privilege” issues is inexplicable, given that much of the enabling activity was in support of federal crimes. We can only hope, though likely in vain, that Congressional hearings will flesh out the hanging questions.

Mueller Report Part II – Trump Guilty of Obstruction of Justice-E

E. Mueller’s Inexplicably Generous Treatment of Trump’s Knowledge of Events

Another of the remarkable and unexplained conclusions reached by Mueller was that the evidence of Trump’s knowledge about Flynn’s lies about Kislyak was inconclusive. II MR-46. This conclusion seems flatly inconsistent with Trump’s statement to Christie that firing Flynn ended the Russia collusion issue.  II MR-38. We are asked to believe that Flynn told McFarland that his contacts with Kislyak had averted a major policy conflict with Russia but she did not pass that on to Trump! And that neither she nor Bannon could remember this major development! This is yet another example of Mueller’s lack of aggressive approach to Trump. WHY didn’t the SCO interview Trump to get at answers to these critical questions instead of saying they had enough evidence and it was late in the investigation? It is also unclear why it mattered so much whether Trump knew about Flynn’s deception close to the time the Kislyak talks occurred.

Even more puzzling is Mueller’s conclusion that Trump’s effort to get K.T. McFarland to write an internal email saying that Trump did not direct Flynn to talk to Kislyak was not an attempt to have McFarland lie. II MR-48. What then was Trump trying to get McFarland to do?  What is the alternative explanation for Trump’s request of her? This is another example where evidence of corrupt intent is simply written off as “insufficient” without explanation. IF SCO had interviewed Trump, questions like this could have been resolved instead of being left open and then construed as exonerating Trump.

A similar problem arises regarding Trump’s campaign to have Attorney General Jeff Sessions un-recuse himself regarding the Russia investigation. In a footnote Mueller says it was unclear that Trump was aware of White House counsel’s admonition not to contact Sessions. II MR-50, n. 289. Why isn’t Trump chargeable with constructive knowledge of WH counsel’s directive? Trump declined to read documents — does that relieve him of responsibility for knowing what was official White House policy that had been put in writing?  Moreover, if the SCO had interviewed Trump, it could have gotten answers to these questions left open and ultimately construed in Trump’s favor on grounds that the evidence did not show he knew something that, on a common sense view, he almost certainly did know.

Mueller’s generous treatment of Trump continued in the discussion of Comey’s briefing of the Gang of Eight legislators in March, 2017, about the Russia investigation. Mueller said it’s “unclear” whether Trump knew about the briefing at the time, but notes taken by McGahn’s chief of staff say that “POTUS in panic/chaos.” II MR-52. How/why would Trump be in a panic if he didn’t know about Comey’s briefing of Congressional leaders? How could the president be ignorant of such developments that might have such huge impacts on his presidency and to which he had devoted so much attention in the past few months?

 The Comey briefing led to one of the clearest cases of obstruction of justice, in that Trump demanded, and McGahn complied, that McGahn contact Dana Boente, then acting assistant attorney general at Justice, to publicly correct the “misperception” that Trump was under investigation. II MR-54,55. Once again, Trump insiders had failed memories of demands Trump made for intervention with the Department of Justice. II MR-5. And, there is no attempt to explain inconsistencies in other testimony from some of the same insiders, claiming Trump never ordered them to do anything wrong. These statements from NSA Director Rogers are inconsistent with the contemporaneous memo of the President’s call and of NSA Deputy Director Ledgett’s characterization of the extraordinary nature of the call. II MR-56. Why is there no consideration of these inconsistencies?

When Trump then reached out directly to Comey to ask him to relieve the impression Trump was under investigation, the Report, unbelievably, turns to McGahn’s asserted recall of what Dana Boente told him Comey had told Boente about Trump’s contacts with him. II MR-59.  As usual, Boente claimed not to recall this discussion. II MR-60.

Then, in one of the most remarkable moments in the Report, Mueller drops into a footnote (II MR-59, n. 376) the reminder that White House counsel had advised Trump not to contact DOJ about the investigation. Mueller seemingly attached no significance to the extraordinary & undisputed fact that Trump on multiple occasions ignored the advice of his White House attorneys by reaching out directly to Comey to discuss relieving the pressure of the Russia investigation. WHY? This was not the conduct of an innocent man.

Mueller seemed to be impressed with the fact that the people involved claimed that they did not interpret Trump’s repeated importunings as “directives” to interfere in the investigation. II MR-60. These people were all Trump appointees and true believers in his politics, who would naturally seek to maintain favor with him by declining to interpret his repeated requests as “directives.” In any case, the real question is not what they thought, but what Trump intended and the only way to get to the bottom of that ultimately was to interrogate him, which SCO, curiously, declined to demand. Trump’s attempts to secure a champion at DOJ included personal contacts with Coates, Pompeo, Rogers and Comey. Despite that, Mueller, with his usual reticence to accept the obvious, concludes that “the evidence does not establish that the President asked or directed intelligence agency leaders to stop or interfere with the FBI’s Russia investigation.” II MR-60.

The same question arises in connection with Trump’s multiple attempts to prevent AG Sessions from recusing himself from oversight of the Russia investigation. A couple of things are clear. Trump thought the AG worked for him personally and therefore that Sessions should remain in place to do Trump’s bidding regarding the investigation. And, White House counsel tried to cut off communications with Sessions about recusal to avoid the appearance of attempted interference with the investigation. Yet, once again, Mueller states it was “not clear” that the “no contact” directive was conveyed to Trump. II MR-61. HOW is it remotely plausible that White House counsel, in a matter of seminal importance, would not have conveyed this information to the one person whose knowledge of it and compliance was the most important? Why didn’t the SCO demand Trump answer this question? He refused to do so even in writing and the SCO let him get away with it!

Mueller repeatedly and uncritically refers to Trump’s asserted belief that the Russia investigation was somehow interfering with, Miller his ability to conduct foreign policy but never discussed how that interference worked or what real impact it had on a president who, by all accounts, spent most of his time watching television and playing golf. II MR-61.

Another point of clarity in the Report is the finding that Trump lied about the basis for firing Comey. II MR-62. Why would he do that except to cover up his corrupt motive to which he shortly confessed? Trump’s lies about his conduct, in the context of his other actions, were a clear case of cover-up that could have been treated as a separate offense by Mueller if he had the aggressive instincts of a prosecutor rather than the timidity of an equivocator.

A related question – why was Stephen Miller not indicted for his role in preparing a phony letter to cover Trump’s tracks regarding the firing of Comey? II MR-64. Another related question: the final stated reason for firing Comey was pretextual. All Trump cared about was establishing that he was not under FBI investigation and that he was firing Comey because Comey refused to say that publicly. The Rosenstein/Sessions memo was constructed as an alternate explanation that Trump then adopted while still insisting, against advice, that the point about his not being under investigation be prominently included in the firing letter. II MR-67. Yet, again, no indictments were brought against any of the president’s men for conspiring and lying to cover the tracks of a discharge action plainly intended to obstruct the FBI investigation. See, e.g., II MR-70 regarding lies told by Sean Spicer, then Press Secretary about the motivation for the Comey firing.

Mueller basically gave a pass to all Trump’s enablers who accepted and acted on his directions. Michael Cohen, in later testimony before Congress, spoke specifically about how Trump rarely gave specific directions for anything. He spoke in “code,” that Cohen claimed he understood. It is beyond credibility that, by the time of Comey’s firing, the president’s men did not also understand how he “directed” what he wanted done, what he insisted upon, without ever explicitly saying so. Mueller appears to have completely overlooked this aspect of Trump’s directorial style, crediting him with innocence because there was no overt statement by him that amounted to a confession. In the future, then, Trump’s enablers have no reason to fear repercussions when they willingly follow his non-order orders.

Further evidence of Mueller’s timidity may be found in his ultimate conclusion that “the anticipated effect of removing the FBI director … would not necessarily be to prevent or impede the FBI from continuing its investigation.” II MR-74. That astonishing statement shows Mueller going out of his way to avoid the overt implications of evidence regarding Trump’s actions that were, by Trump’s own admission, intended to interfere with the Russia investigation. Why else would he have fired Comey and handled the firing as he did, including conspiring to give the impression that Rosenstein/Sessions were responsible for the firing? A seasoned prosecutor like Mueller surely knew better, but falls all over himself in avoiding the plain implications of Trump’s conduct. Moreover, even if the investigation would have been unfazed by Comey’s firing (and thus completely ignored by the surviving DOJ attorneys), the clear intent of the discharge was proven and, as Mueller’s own statement of the governing legal tests showed, an attempt to obstruct does not have to be successful to violate the criminal law.

Curiously, the Report takes a somewhat different approach to assessing evidence of Trump’s intentions when it addresses Trump’s attempts to have the Special Counsel removed. II MR-84 thru MR-90. This may be the result of superior clarity of the evidence but this is not apparent from the Report language. One explanation may be that the “committee” of lawyers that drafted the Report were assigned different sections and that each one had a different approach. The analysis highlights the fact that Trump lied publicly about whether he had tried to have Mueller removed, an approach Trump had taken to other issues but which led to Mueller equivocating about the strength of the evidence. II MR-90.

It is a fair question as to why Mueller did not indict Cory Lewandowski whom Trump chose as the go-between to direct AG Jeff Sessions to publicly speak about the unfairness of the SCO investigation and to limit its authority to future elections only. The recited evidence clearly shows that both Chief of Staff Kelly and Lewandowski himself were well aware of the impropriety of Trump’s demands and took actions to conceal his conduct from exposure. II MR 91-93 & n. 604.

Regarding the infamous Trump Tower meeting, the evidence is clear that Trump took overt actions to cover up the situation. II MR-98 to MR-107. Yes, Mueller concludes that Trump’s actions were merely part of a press strategy and not an effort to affect the SCO investigation or the related work of Congressional investigations. This is an astonishing judgment when the SCO allowed Trump to avoid testifying and be examined about this subject. It is therefore impossible to conclude that these obstructive acts did not occur. Moreover, Trump clearly acted dishonestly regarding disclosure of the information and created a misleading paper trail that could have affected decisions at SCO about what to do regarding the Trump Tower meeting. Mueller resolved all doubts in favor of Trump even in face of evidence of his lies and duplicity regarding the issue at hand.

Other instances of Mueller’s resolving doubts in favor of Trump or his people involved Trump’s effort, using his personal counsel, to have McGahn publish a statement denying that Trump had asked him to fire Mueller. Mueller resigns to a footnote and fails to explain the conflict between Hope Hicks & Gen. Kelly regarding whether the McGahn resistance story was correct. II MR-114, n. 788. Kelly, Sarah Sanders and Rob Porter all experienced memory failure regarding aspects of Trump’s demands and denials about trying to get McGahn to fire Mueller. Trump, of course, remorselessly lied to his own staff about what he had said. II MR-115. He continued to press McGahn to “correct” stories that ” McGahn repeatedly told Trump, and others, was accurate as written. II MR 116-117. Mueller resorts to the gentlest possible language when describing these activities, using phrases such as “runs counter to the evidence” as opposed to the more precise “he lied.” II MR-118.

Rob Porter played a direct role in delivering Trump’s demands to McGahn (II MR-116) but, without explanation, was not indicted for conspiracy to obstruct justice.

Mueller Report Part II – Trump Guilty of Obstruction of Justice – D

D. Why Weren’t Trump’s Enablers Indicted?

One of the great lingering mysteries about Mueller’s treatment of the obstruction issues is why he did not secure indictments of Trump’s enablers when the evidence clearly indicated their involvement in promoting the obstruction that Trump was executing. One prominent example of this is K.T. McFarland, who seemed to act as a go-between for Trump to direct Michael Flynn. It is implausible, I suggest, to believe that McFarland would not have revealed discussions with Flynn and Russian Ambassador Kislyak in meeting with Trump one hour after talking to Flynn about those discussions. II MR-25. As referenced earlier in these posts, Flynn had multiple memory failure about the information he may have discussed with other administration officials and Trump himself. The Russian response to the US sanctions was apparently a matter of considerable importance to Trump and his administration. Given Flynn’s admission of lying about his contacts with Kislyak, it is very hard to conclude that these memory failures were legitimate and that neither Trump nor his principal enablers were kept in the dark.

Beyond all that, McFarland followed Flynn’s directions to tell the Washington Post that no discussion of sanctions had occurred with Kislyak. Mueller specifically says, “McFarland made the call as Flynn had requested although she knew she was providing false information….” II MR-29. No charges were brought against McFarland for her role in this ruse. Why not?

Putting aside the further implausibility of Trump, after a lifetime of litigation and political commentary, denying that he understood the law, one thing is clear: as of January 26, 2017, Don McGahn, White House counsel, explained both 18 USC 1001 (crime to lie to federal government) and the Logan Act (crime for citizen of U.S. to communicate with a foreign government with intent to influence the foreign government in relation to disputes with the U.S. or to defeat the measures of the U.S.). II MR-31.

Rather than extending this already-long narrative about the multiple situations in which credible evidence shows Trump committed obstruction of justice and possibly other crimes, I want to raise some questions about the obstruction investigation that cry out for answers but are not explained in the Mueller Report.

One of the big ones relates to the visits by Acting Attorney General Sally Yates to the White House to explain that the Justice Department had evidence indicating Gen. Flynn had been compromised by his lies about interactions with Russian Ambassador Kislyak. When Yates returned to the White House on January 27, 2017, at the request of White House counsel Don McGahn, he asked to see the information DOJ had on Flynn’s contacts with Kislyak. This information was provided! II MR-33, n. 166. It was reviewed by John Eisenberg, legal advisor to the National Security Council. Why did the Acting AG think it was a good idea to provide the evidence to the White House in light of Trump’s history of denying Russian influence in the election and lying about events related to it? Why would Yates think that the White House would act against Flynn?

As it turned out, that was the same day that Trump invited FBI Director Comey to a private dinner at the White House, disregarding not for the first nor last time, the advice of White House counsel to avoid the appearance of political interference with law enforcement. II MR-33. That, of course, was the dinner at which Trump demanded “loyalty” from Comey. II MR-34. Both Press Secretary Sanders and counsel McGahn adopted Trump’s denials of the “loyalty” demand, thereby making themselves collaborators in what Mueller concluded, based on all the evidence, was a series of Trump lies about what transpired. II MR-35, 36 and 35, n. 183. Yet, neither Sanders nor McGahn was indicted. Why not?

In the end, Trump reluctantly fired Flynn while assuring him that he would be taken care of. II MR-38. The very next day Trump cleared a meeting room of witnesses and asked Comey to let Flynn go. II MR-40. Astoundingly, Jared Kushner, one of those dismissed, claimed he could not remember that Trump asked Comey to remain behind for a private meeting.  II MR-40, n. 233. Trump continued to assure Flynn of his kind regard for him into late March or early April. II MR-44.

Trump continued to lie about the Flynn situation, going so far as to claim he did not recall the “loyalty” meeting at all. II MR-44. Trump insiders Priebus & McGahn minced words regarding Trump’s attempts to call off Comey from the Flynn investigation. II MR-44, n. 270.

Mueller Report Part II – Trump Guilty of Obstruction of Justice-B, C

B. Governing Legal Standards

Little value can be gained by repeating Mueller’s recitation of the legal standards for judging whether criminal obstruction of justice has occurred. Of the three tests (obstructive acts, nexus to a pending or contemplated official proceeding and corrupt intent), the Report conclusively shows (1) multiple, repeated obstructive acts by Trump personally, in some of which he was aided and abetted by members of the White House staff and (2) clear nexus to multiple investigations, including some of the obstructive acts themselves.

Given the rhetorical and other linguistic hoops that Trump and his attorneys/advisors have been willing to jump through to defend him, it is worth nothing that Mueller made plain that “an improper motive can render an actor’s conduct criminal even when the conduct would otherwise be lawful and within the actor’s authority.” II MR-9. Equally, if not more, important, is Mueller’s determination that criminal obstruction can exist even if the attempt is unsuccessful. II MR-12. It also includes “witness tampering” and attempts to influence others not to cooperate with law enforcement. II MR-10, 11, 12.

C. Trump’s Refusal to Cooperate

Mueller’s treatment of the president is noteworthy and inexplicable in several ways, given the gravity of what was being investigated.

Mueller allowed Trump to dither away a year following the SCO’s request for a voluntary interview. II MR-13 Trump ultimately agreed to answer some written questions about “Russia-related topics” but refused to answer any questions regarding obstruction of justice or events occurring during the transition. Despite concluding that the SCO had both the authority and the legal justification for a grand jury subpoena of Trump, the SCO decided not to force the issue. The SCO reasoning behind this extraordinary decision was that a such a late stage in the investigation, a subpoena, and the inevitable legal dispute to follow, could result in a “substantial delay.” The SCO also believed it had separately found evidence sufficient to “understand relevant events and to make certain assessments” even without Trump’s personal testimony. II MR-13.

This decision is quite remarkable. The investigation was in a “late stage” because Mueller had allowed Trump to fend off a decision and play an obvious delaying game for an entire year. Moreover, the statement that the investigation was at a late stage was not explained in the Report. Was there an internally-imposed deadline on when the investigation had to conclude? If so, who imposed that deadline and when? If not, then the “late stage” rationalization is pure vapor and another example of kid-glove treatment for a person as to whom substantial evidence existed of multiple acts of obstruction of justice. The decision left the SCO to infer conclusions based on circumstantial evidence in some cases and, while this is normal and often unavoidable (II MR-13), there was no compelling reason for the SCO to allow itself to be maneuvered into this position. Moreover, the credibility factors that apply in assessing testimony, enumerated by Mueller in details (II MR-14) all would work against Trump.

The ultimate outcome of Mueller’s reticence was that the door was opened for Attorney General Barr to declare falsely that the case was not even close and that Trump was innocent of all the charges. This opportunity to undermine the credibility of the Mueller investigation traces directly back to the strategic mistake of allowing Trump to avoid testifying.

The bulk of Volume II of the Mueller Report is devoted to a lawyerly application of the three obstruction elements to the various discrete situations in which Trump or his enablers in the White House or elsewhere attempted, one way or another, to derail the Russia investigation and any evaluation of his acts of obstruction. Several major points stand out.

First, Trump lied about numerous events. For anyone following the arc of his presidency with a reasonably open mind, this comes as no surprise. One obvious lie, for example, was Trump’s claim that he had no business dealings in Russia. II MR-15. An interesting thing to note is that as regards WikiLeaks release of Clinton’s emails, there was evidence Trump was plugged into the information pipeline about what WikiLeaks was planning to do. II MR-18. That portion of the Report is heavily redacted, indicating on-going investigation into the WikiLeaks connections. Mueller’s refusal to discuss the Report publicly leaves us to wonder what this on-going matter is about, a subject that should be pursued in his upcoming public testimony before Congress.

Mueller also notes that the Campaign tried to distance itself from people who were publicly identified as connected to Russians. Vice President Pence joined in the denials of Russia connections. II MR 20-21. All these moves are equally, if not more, plausible as efforts to conceal the Russia connection by outwardly disassociating from campaign people whose connections became known and publicized. Mueller also cites the opinion of unnamed Trump advisors for the point that Trump genuinely believed the stories about Russia connections undermined the legitimacy of his electoral victory. II MR-23. No doubt the stories did have that effect because the Russian support for Trump plainly does de-legitimize his standing as a “duly elected” president.

The inclusion and apparent full crediting of these statements from Trump campaign insiders, without Trump himself being questioned, seems designed to buttress the idea that Trump genuinely believed the Russian interference was a false story designed to undermine his legitimacy. But even if true, these claims about what he was thinking are entirely self-serving and based on interested 3rd party statements not supported by his own testimony under examination.

Mueller Report Part II – Trump Guilty of Obstruction of Justice-A

In many ways, the obstruction of justice issue is the easiest to understand. But, among other factors, because the Attorney General, a Trump appointee, took it upon himself to assert publicly conclusions that the Mueller Report plainly did not reach, the question has been clouded in the public mind. Republican lackies for the president, and the President himself, continue to repeat the AG’s lies about the Report.

The following analysis will endeavor to tell the truth about the Mueller Report and to ask fair questions that remain in the Report’s wake and as a result of Mueller’s refusal to speak about the substance of the Report.

A. Declining to Decide – Why Was This Not Disclosed at the Outset?

The Report opens with a summary statement of five major-impact concepts that shaped the investigation and the Report as its outcome (the Report says there are only four, but a careful reading indicates five).

  1. The Office of Special Counsel (OSC) accepted the 2000 Justice Department legal conclusion that a sitting president could not be indicted – the Report refers to this as a limitation on “prosecutorial jurisdiction;” II MR 1.
  2. The OSC believed, independent of the Justice Department’s opinion about constitutional constraints, indictment of the sitting president would “place burdens on the President’s capacity to govern and potentially preempt constitutional processes for addressing presidential misconduct.” II MR 1.
  3. Investigation is nonetheless permitted during the presidential term, immunity does not follow the person after presidential service is over and, very importantly: “if individuals other than the President committed an obstruction offense, they may be prosecuted at this time.” II MR 1.
  4. The OSC decided not to apply an “approach that could potentially result in a judgment that the President committed crimes” because it would be unfair to make such findings when the opportunity for a speedy trial on the charges would not be possible. II MR 2
  5. Notwithstanding (4) above, if the OSC concluded that the president did not commit crimes, it would have so stated, but it could not so state based on the evidence developed; therefore, the Report neither accuses nor exonerates the president. II MR 2

These introductory words in the Report raise many questions, among them:

  1. If the SCO knew at the outset that it would not issue indictments, why was this not disclosed at the beginning?
  2. I will go into this in much more detail later, but given the overwhelming evidence that Trump engaged in multiple acts of obstruction, why was not a single person indicted from his staff, his cabinet and in the Republican Party that supported his every falsehood and deflection?
  3. How was the investigative approach altered to assure that a “judgment that the President committed crimes” was not the result?
  4. Why was the Special Counsel prepared, if the evidence supported it, to publish a conclusion that the president was innocent of obstruction while being unwilling/unable to publish a conclusion that crimes were committed even if the evidence overwhelmingly supported that judgment? In light of this, the worst that the president could have faced was a finding that the evidence did not exonerate him. Considering that the alternative, an indictment, was never a possibility, Trump easily could see the outcome as a victory. And he did. And it appears that, at least in that sense, this was inevitable. The deck was stacked in Trump’s favor from the beginning.
  5. Was Mueller’s “no finding of innocence” a kind of double wink, saying, in effect, “my hands were tied, but here’s the evidence for Congress to make the obvious conclusion of guilt and impeach? Maybe, but that seems pretty naïve considering that, until the 2018 mid-term elections, Republicans controlled both houses of Congress and still control the Senate.

I’m not going to go into the details here, but I studied the entire 2000 Justice Department opinion finding that indictment of a sitting president is unconstitutional and it is remarkable in its presumption of undemonstrated facts. It employs extreme language when discussing the presumed burden on the president of having to defend an indictment while in office and seems to be written more to justify a pre-determined result than to analyze the situation neutrally. Like the Mueller investigation itself, the 2000 OLC opinion, like the 1973 opinion that it confirms, seems to have a pre-ordained outcome. Considering that the current occupant of the White House spends little time actually doing presidential work, the overblown language of the OLC opinions rings hollow, turning, as it does, entirely on the presumed interference with presidential responsibilities of the obligation to defend criminal charges.

Turning to the matter at hand, the Mueller Report begins with a summary of the “issues and events” that were examined for obstruction evidence. It includes:

(1) Trump’s lies about his business interests in Russia;

(2) Michael Flynn’s lies about his contacts with Russian Ambassador Kislyak;

(3) Trump’s attempt to extract loyalty commitments and a pledge to leave Flynn alone from then FBI Director Comey;

(4) Trump’s attempt to direct his Deputy National Security Advisor (K.T. McFarland) to produce a letter falsely stating the president had not directed Flynn to discuss U.S. sanctions with Kislyak (why would Trump try to manufacture evidence that he was innocent of soliciting help from Russia if he were innocent?);

(5) Trump’s attempt to prevent Attorney General Jeff Sessions from recusing himself regarding the Russia investigation;

(6) Trump’s attempt to use U.S. intelligence officials and again the FBI Director to make public statements exonerating him from involvement in Russian election interference;

(7) Trump’s firing of FBI Director Comey for the expressed purpose of relieving himself of the Russia investigation;

(8) Trump’s manipulation of the Comey firing letter to make it appear the firing was based on DOJ recommendations when in fact Trump had decided to fire Comey before hearing from DO;

(9) Trump’s attempt to have White House counsel tell the Acting Attorney General that the Special Counsel had conflicts of interest and must be fired;

(10) Trump’s attempt to limit Special Counsel to investigating future election meddling;

(11) Trump’s false narrative about the origins of the Trump Tower meeting, including repeated false denials by his personal attorney that Trump had any role in Trump Jr’s statement about the meeting;

(12) Trump’s attempts to pressure Sessions into un-recusing regarding the Russia investigation;

(13) Trump’s attempts to have White House counsel McGahn falsely state that Trump had not ordered him to have the Special Counsel removed; and

(14) Trump’s attempt to influence testimony from Flynn, Manafort and Cohen, including involvement by Trump’s personal attorney.

The Report then went through a most curious “on the one hand, on the other hand,” regarding Trump’s possible motives for interfering in the SCO investigation, defined by the point at which Trump became aware that he was personally under investigation. Mueller referred to these as “overarching factual issues.” II MR-7. Mueller expressed concern that some of Trump’s actions were within his Article II authority and that his motives should be judged in light of the fact that the investigation found no underlying crime in the Russia investigation, even though such a finding was unnecessary and despite the fact that Trump acted, throughout the entire period, as if he were guilty. II MR-7. Here, Mueller seems to have forgotten his own admonition that the absence of discovered evidence of participation in Russian interference was not proof that no such participation occurred. Finally, Mueller cites the fact that some of Trump’s allegedly obstructive conduct took place in public, although, again, the harm done would be the same for public as for secretive obstructive acts. II MR-7.

My sense of this odd insertion into the Report is that Mueller is revealing a disinclination to hold the president to account when he can’t indict. He is, in effect, gilding the lily in favor of Trump. However, in next analyzing various defenses asserted by Trump’s attorneys, Mueller concludes, correctly I think, that the corrupt use of Article II powers is not immune conduct. Mueller notes that the requirement of corrupt intent is a high standard and “requires a concrete showing that a person acted with an intent to obtain an improper advantage for himself or someone else, inconsistent with official duty and the rights of others.” II MR-8.

In the end, Mueller reaffirms the “principle that no person is above the law.” II MR-8. The Report then also concludes that based on the evidence adduced, the SCO could not find that the president committed no obstruction of justice crime. Therefore, although forbidden by policy from stating the prosecutorial conclusion that crimes were committed, the Report “does not exonerate him.” II MR-8.

Despite the clarity of that conclusion, the sitting Attorney General and then Trump himself concluded that the Report did exonerate him. Those statements by the AG and the President were false. The AG also said that he had independently evaluated all the evidence underlying Mueller’s Report and that he, the AG, had concluded that there was no evidence to support a finding of criminal conduct by the president. All that need to said about that is it is extremely unlikely that the AG personally was able to review the entirety of the evidence gathered by Mueller’s team in the time the AG had with the draft report. In making these claims, the AG stepped out of his role as Attorney General of the United States and acted as if he were Trump’s personal attorney defending him against Mueller. Barr’s conclusions should be discounted completely since they conflict with the evidence disclosed in the Report that clearly and strongly demonstrates that Trump did commit obstruction of justice on multiple occasions.

MUELLER REPORT PART I – TRUMP CANOODLING WITH RUSSIA – E

E. Evidence of Conspiracy Everywhere But No Conspiracy?

It also seems very significant that all evidence regarding Manafort’s communications with Russians could not be seen because it was encrypted and that Manafort lied to the Grand Jury and to the SCO about, among other things, the Campaign data he fed to Kilimnik. I-MR 130. Trump himself had the usual memory failure regarding the changes made to the Republican Platform dealing with the Ukraine.  I-MR 130, n. 841.

It follows that Mueller never really got to the bottom of Campaign connections with Russia. The investigation could not resolve, for example, what happened to the polling data that Manafort gave to Kilimnik. I-MR 131. SCO concluded Kilimnik, who was long-term employee of Manafort, was connected to Russian intelligence. I-MR 133. In the end, however, Mueller simply concludes that the investigation found no evidence of a connection between Manafort’s sharing of polling data with Kilimnik or that Manafort otherwise coordinated with Russia regarding the Campaign. Given the holes in the evidence, it is difficult to see how this conclusion is justified. Recall Mueller’s early warning that the absence of evidence is not evidence of the absence.

Note that Manafort worked for Campaign without pay even though he had no meaningful income at the time, allegedly (by Gates) because he expected to monetize his relationship with the Trump administration after the election. I-MR 135.

WHY, however, was the sending of internal polling data about the Campaign not an act of coordination that would have aided the Russians in their campaign to assist Trump by, for example, timing of document releases?  Moreover, Manafort offered “private briefings” to billionaire tycoon Oleg Deripaska (but, once questioned, said it was just about “public campaign matters).”  I-MR 137. Of course, Manafort would claim that, but what sense does that make? Surely, Deripaska could find out all the “public” campaign information he desired from the Russian intelligence agencies or other Russian sources. WHY did Mueller not explain this?  Deripaska now, of course, denies almost everything regarding his interest in American politics and refused to cooperate with Mueller’s investigation. https://nyti.ms/2WJC7Tz

At a dinner August 2, 2016, Manafort briefed Kilimnik on Campaign plans in four battleground states (MI, MN, PA, WI). I-MR 140. WHY is this not an act of coordination, since Manafort knew and expected Kilimnik to report to Russians with an interest in the election? What alternative explanation is there other than some vague notion that providing this information would endear Russians to Manafort, help get his Ukraine consulting bills paid and generally enhance his standing with Russians interested in removing US sanctions? Even if that was Manafort’s only motivation, the fact remains that these acts would have the natural effect of facilitating any Russian actions related to election interference which was found to be based on supporting Trump over Clinton. Manafort likely knew that — he and Gates left the Aug. 2 dinner separate from Kilimnik to avoid media attention to their relationship. I-MR 141

The Report concludes that it found no evidence that Manafort brought Kilimnik’s Ukraine peace plan to the attention of the Trump Campaign or the Trump Administration, yet says Kilimnik continued promoting the plan to the State Dept into the summer of 2018.  I-MR 144. Since at that time the State Department was under the control of the Trump Administration, why would Mueller distinguish the State Department from the Administration?

The Report, at I-MR 144, notes that immediately after the election Russians connected with the Russian government began outreaches to the Trump Administration but through business rather than political channels. The implication of this statement seems to be that using business channels somehow distinguishes the outreach from conspiratorial implications. But using business channels makes perfect sense, considering that Trump was not a politician and was, for the most part, not surrounded by politicians in his Campaign organization. Those realities should not affect the interpretation of the purpose of the Russian contacts.

The Report discussion on Russian government outreach begins with Hope Hicks receiving a personal cell phone call at 3 am on election night from what turned out to be Sergey Kuznetzov at the Russian Embassy in DC with a message from Putin to Trump. I-MR 145. HOW did Kuznetzov have Hicks’ personal cell phone number? Mueller never addresses that question.

Shortly before Kuznetzov’s outreach, an unidentified person [redacted for Investigative Technique] wrote to Kirill Dmitriev that “Putin has won.” I-MR 149. This odd message is not further elaborated.

The Report details at length the numerous efforts of various Russian parties to contact the incoming administration and the Trump team’s complete willingness to engage immediately despite the well-established principle that the US has only one president at a time.

Another curious development was that despite Kushner’s initial resistance to meeting with Kislyak, his immediate acceptance of a meeting with Sergey Gorkov, the head of Vnesheconombank, a Russian government-owned bank then under American sanctions stemming from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, led to Kushner and Gorkov telling two completely different stories about what they discussed. I-MR 163. The Report notes that this conflict was never resolved but Mueller was unconcerned because there was no evidence of further discussions between the two men. However, Kushner’s assistant refused a second meeting request from Gorkov because of publicity about the Russia investigation, allegedly without even telling Kushner about the request. I-MR 163. The inference from all this is that everyone in the Trump team was acting independently, not talking with other members of the team even about extremely sensitive matters such as repeated outreaches to them by Russian operatives. Is this plausible?

Regarding the sanctions on Russia for election interference, Michael Flynn, allegedly acting on his own, proposed to Ambassador Kislyak that Russia not escalate the situation, a proposal that was accepted. I-MR 167. WHY is this not coordination even by Mueller’s limited definition? Perhaps because Trump was already President-Elect, but then why so much Report space devoted to post-election activities by Russians reaching out to Trump administration? If Mueller was really looking for post-election evidence of pre-election coordination, there were many curious situations that needed explanation and didn’t get one.

Mueller appears to believe that actions by Trump staff are not a problem for Trump unless Trump personally asked them to take an inappropriate action. BUT WHY is that so, when almost all actions by any administration are taken by staff and most of the time the President is not personally involved in details of who speaks with whom?

The Report portrays the Russians as a bunch of neophyte amateurs at sleuthing, the Keystone Kops of international conspiring. Is it plausible to believe that Vladimir Putin, a former KGB agent with all the resources of the Russian intelligence apparatus at his instant disposal, did not know how to contact high level people in the incoming Trump administration? 

When Egypt proposed a UN resolution calling on Israel to stop settlements in Palestinian territory, the Trump team, not yet in power, worked with foreign governments, including Russia to defeat the resolution, knowing that the Obama Administration would not oppose it. I-MR 168. WHY is this not giving aid and comfort to an enemy of the US? WHY was this not “coordination” under Mueller’s own definition of conspiracy?

Mueller treats this as just routine despite its breach of a long-standing practice/policy/principle that we have one president at a time.  Why is working directly with foreign governments to defeat the policies of the sitting administration, without registration or other public disclosure, not tantamount to treason if not actually treason? Trump personally participated in this when he stated publicly that he was opposed to the sanctions imposed by Obama Administration. I-MR 169.

Transition Team members continued to talk among themselves about how to deter Russians from responding adversely to the Obama sanctions. I-MR 170. The Campaign thus was plotting to undermine the Obama foreign policy position on Russia sanctions, with Obama still in office, without any attempt to consult with Obama or his staff about why sanctions were imposed. Trump was personally briefed by KT McFarland, during which Trump disputed that Russians had interfered with the election, a conclusion that the Mueller investigation demolished. I-MR 171. Trump was personally aware that a member of the Transition Team, who else but Flynn, would be talking with Kislyak that very evening. Russians, on direct order of Putin, did not retaliate regarding the sanctions. Flynn told Mueller he did not document his contacts with Kislyak because he knew they were interfering with Obama administration foreign policy. I-MR 172.

Ultimately, Mueller uses ambiguous language to conclude that there were no chargeable crimes involving Campaign people. Although the Campaign was “receptive to the offer,” the “investigation did not establish that the Campaign coordinated or conspired with the Russian government in its election-interference activities.” I-MR 173.  No charge, for example, re Internet Research Agency election actions because Mueller had no evidence that Campaign people knew they were interacting with Russians engaged in a criminal conspiracy. I-MR 175. Who, then, did they think they were dealing with? Why are these adults not to be held accountable for their deliberate conduct while turning a blind eye to the reality behind the mask? Mueller never explained his generous treatment of the Campaign and its leader when it came to their refusal to see what was plainly in front of them.

Part of the problem here, it seems, is that Congress has not updated the National Stolen Property Act to include electronic information. See I-MR 176, n. 1278. And, redactions based on extensive Harm to Ongoing Matters in the section addressing indictments indicate that there are major important cases still under active investigation. See I-MR 176-180, 183-184

The Mueller Report explanation of the failure to charge certain criminal offenses is lacking in meaningful detail. The decision was based mainly on the belief that evidence of offenses under campaign finance laws, in particular the Trump Tower meeting re Clinton’s emails, could not establish that participants “willfully” violated the law. I-MR 180. The conclusions that no Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) violations could be proved against Papadopoulos and Page, for example, were stated in a summary way without detailed explanation of why their many contacts with Russia nationals during the campaign did not involve, at least, attempts to violate the FARA.  See I-MR 183.

Mueller notes Papadopoulos’ lies about when he heard from Mifsud that the Russians had dirt on Clinton and that he understood that Mifsud was connected at high levels in the Russian government. He also lied about when he met Olga Polonskaya, whom he also believed was well connected with Russian government officials at a high level. I-MR 193. The result, however, was that Papadopoulos was charged with making false statements but his activities were not imputed to the campaign. Is it plausible to believe that an ambitious person like Papadopoulos was not reporting his activities to others in the Campaign even if only orally?

 Michael Flynn also lied about, among several things, his contacts with Ambassador Kislyak which were made in close contact with KT McFarland, then a “senior Transition Team official.” I-MR 194. Again, despite the close coordination with McFarland, Mueller showed no appetite for attributing any intentionality or responsibility to the Campaign or the Transition Team for the unexplained coverup of Flynn’s contacts with the Russians.

Note, on the other hand, that in the discussion of false statements by various figures in the Trump Campaign and/or Transition Team, there are two major redactions including the name of the individual involved: one based on grand jury testimony (I-MR 194) and the other involving Harm to an Ongoing Matter (I-MR 196-197). This strongly suggests there are additional potential cases of lying to the government still being investigated by some element of the federal government. Mueller should provide some explanation of the further work to be done, given his decision to terminate his office’s work.

Mueller also gives Jeff Sessions the benefit of the doubt even when Sessions, fully aware of the broad inquiry into cooperation with Russia, chose to interpret questions as calling for the narrowest possible construction. Mueller concludes that the evidence did not establish that Sessions was “willfully untruthful.” I-MR 198. If not, then what was it? Unintentional untruthfulness?

Mueller notes that the proof of a willful violation of FARA requires some defendant knowledge of the law. I-MR 185. Mueller seems to believe that none of the lobbyists and other experts that Trump enlisted to help him knew anything about the law governing acting on behalf of a foreign government to influence an election. Even a modicum of common sense would suggest, at a minimum, that lawyers be consulted in such circumstances. Willful ignorance does not excuse a law violation, as anyone can attest who has been ticketed for speeding and claimed not to see, for example, the School Zone signs. The principle of “knew or should have known” should apply here and, if not, there should be an explanation of why it is not applicable.

The gaping holes in the analysis of the facts suggest that some parts of the investigation were very broad but not very deep in key areas. Rather than take an aggressive approach, Mueller seems to have been concerned more about losing a case than about securing prosecution of people who actively worked to subvert a national election by seeking help from a hostile foreign power.

END OF CONSIDERATION OF MUELLER REPORT PART 1

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COMING SOON – PART II: DID THE PRESIDENT COMMIT THE CRIME OF OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE?