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“Lawless White House” – the Mueller Report – “Oh! What A Tangled Web We Weave …”

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The rest of line, you likely know, is “when first we practice to deceive.” Originally published in 1808 but completely relevant to the politics of today. The quote of a “lawless White House” is in the extraordinary book I’m about to describe.

We’ll never know the whole truth about Russian interference in the 2016 election or, most likely, many of the other crimes committed by Donald Trump and his White House/Congressional enablers. Most of the relevant documents have likely been destroyed or hidden away from the prying eyes of investigators armed with subpoenas and, one may wish, indictments. Trump and his enablers have shown they have no regard for law and will do anything to avoid being held accountable.

A bitter pill to swallow. There is, however, still much we don’t know that can be discovered despite the fact that the relevant rules favor the criminals and traitors – see, e.g., the accused is innocent until proven guilty, proceedings of the grand jury are secret, non-disclosure agreements are enforceable, attorney-client privilege and executive privilege, to name just a few.

In 2019 I read every word of and wrote extensively about the Mueller Report, with emphasis on what seemed to me the glaring shortcomings of the investigation and the conclusions reached. The links to those posts are set out at the end of this post for those who care to look back. Little did I know what was really going on. I had only the report itself and various news reports as sources.

But now we have Andrew Weissmann’s remarkable book, Where Law Ends—Inside the Mueller Investigation, published in Sept. 2020, but which I have just discovered and read compulsively. It is a barn burner in the truest sense and should be read by everyone who is genuinely interested in saving our democracy. When you are done, you will understand much better the frailties of our constitutional system and the means by which a putative dictator can undermine the separation of powers and subvert the rights we have taken for granted.

You know you’re in for a wild ride in the Introduction, where Weissmann describes AG William Barr’s 4-page letter purporting to explain and elaborate on the Mueller Report as “so many deceptions,” “deliberately worded obfuscations,” and “unbridled lies.” Weissman, after a long career in the FBI under Mueller, was put in charge of the “M Team” for the Special Counsel Investigation. The M Team was the group of lawyers, FBI agents and others who would determine what crimes had been committed, if any (obligatory qualification there) by Paul Manafort, who for a time was Donald Trump’s campaign manager, among many other roles. The other teams were the “R” (to investigate Russian interference in the 2016 election and possible collusion by the Trump campaign with Russian bad actors) and the “600” team (to determine whether Trump had obstructed justice in violation of federal law).

Weissmann thus was in the center of the investigation, privy to most of the challenges and involved in most of the discussion of strategy and tactics as Trump’s determination to undermine the investigation at all costs became apparent.

I am only going to touch on some highlights, that I hope will induce everyone reading this to acquire and digest Weissmann’s book. A full summary would far exceed the bounds of a reasonable blog post and give away too much of the astonishing revelations.

With books like this one, there are often questions about the content and timing of publication. The Twitterverse and other commenters reacted as expected, with some questioning “why wait so long?” “why not reveal everything, including the secret grand jury evidence?” and so on. My response to those critics is (1) pre-publication review was essential to the book’s publication at any time, (2) the book is meticulously fact-oriented and replete with legal analysis (presented mainly in laymen’s’ terms) – something of this nature could not be rushed, and (3) Weissmann gained nothing personally or professionally from delay – he was and is committed to the preservation of law and would have been foolish to violate the confidentiality of grand jury proceedings.

It is also telling that, atypically of exposé books, Weissmann does not make himself the unsung hero of the tale. Quite the contrary, he admits to more than one serious error of judgment in dealing with Mueller and Mueller’s uptight top deputy (Aaron Zebley, Mueller’s former Chief of Staff at the FBI) who was brought in from Mueller’s law firm even before Weissmann was hired. Weissmann takes great pains to explain the competing considerations and why he made particular decisions, while also, appropriately in my view, assigning serious errors to people who deserved the rebukes in light of everything known at the time. Anyone who has been involved in any kind of serious investigation (I have) can surely appreciate the difficult choices confronting the leadership of the investigative teams. Nevertheless, rigid thinking and timidity in the face of threats from the subjects of the investigation led to catastrophic errors.

More important, this is a true inside account of the investigation. Weissmann, while in thrall of Mueller before, during and after the investigation/report, is unrelenting in exposing the investigation’s problems and mistakes, laying out the consequences in stark terms. Examples abound throughout the 346 pages. It reads like a good murder mystery, but you know from page one that it is real, not fiction, and all the more chilling for that.

Weissmann flatly accuses the Trump administration of unlawfully interfering with the DOJ Criminal Division in Foreign Corrupt Practices Act cases. Trump had always railed against the FCPA because it interfered with his ability to bribe foreign officials to get development rights he was after overseas.

James Comey comes in for particularly harsh assessment regarding his decision, shortly before the 2016 election, to disclose the discovery of additional emails on the computer of Anthony Weiner who was (inexplicably, to me) the husband of Huma Abedin, a senior aide to Hillary Clinton. Weissmann sets out the multiple options Comey had in addition to the two he claimed were the only ones open to him. Weissmann at 54.

Weissmann also endorses the critique of Comey by Deputy AG Rosenstein while noting that Rosenstein was effectively covering for Trump’s desire to remove Comey because Comey refused to drop the investigation of General Michael Flynn. Weissmann notes that Trump’s statement on the Comey firing was drafted by Trump with Stephen Miller before Rosenstein became aware of Trump’s plan to fire Comey. Thus, “The White House’s effort to pass off the Comey firing as Rosenstein’s idea was a fabrication.” Weissmann at 60. Only one of many, it would turn out.

The White House also withheld from the Special Counsel an important document pertinent to the Russian interference in 2016. Trump’s lack of concern or interest about it made for Obstruction of Justice No. 11 in the pantheon of obstruction uncovered by Mueller, or would have been uncovered. If Mueller had insisted that Trump testify under oath.  Weissmann at 61. In any case, the firing of Comey is explained and shown to be a clear case of obstruction of justice by Trump. Weissman at 64.

An entire chapter of the book is devoted to the infamous Trump Tower meeting, that was the subject of withheld information (Jared Kushner) and lies (Papadopoulos). Weismann at 86. Among the conclusions: “it was clear that the highest levels of the Russian government were trying to help Trump and damage his opponent” and “the Trump campaign was extremely receptive to this help.” Weissmann at 88.

In a second chapter entitled “The Trump Tower Cover-Up,” Weissmann notes that neither Donald Trump nor Don Jr. ever agreed to meet with the investigators voluntarily and neither was brought before the grand jury. And the parties coordinated their versions of events to, among other things, support Don Jr’s claim that he had never meet any Russian officials. Weissmann at 103. Weissmann concluded that Trump himself lied about the Trump Tower meeting, that lying was in effect a basic Trump strategy for solving problems and that he seemed to believe there were never any consequences to his doing so. Weissmann at 107. History, so far, shows that Trump’s belief in his invulnerability is justified.

That episode reveals one of the serious points of disagreement within the investigative team. Team 600 concluded that it had found no evidence, through a witness or documents, that proved the president’s motive in lying was to deceive Congress and thus he could not be found to have engaged in criminal obstruction of justice. Weissmann calls this conclusion “timorous,” which in retrospect seems an understatement at best. Weismann at 108. At 110, Weissman concludes, more precisely, that the Trump Tower meeting was “damning.”

This episode, however, was prescient for the future of the investigation as Mueller and Zebley adopted a narrow and rigid view of the mission of the Special Counsel, what the evidence showed and what was risked by being too aggressive in the investigation. See, e.g., Weissmann at 128-129. Eventually, for a time at least, Mueller realized how impactful Russian interference could be and authorized a more full-throated investigation into all aspects of Russian interference, Weissmann at 132, but the ongoing reality was that Mueller was influenced far too much by Trump’s shenanigans throughout the investigation and creation of the final report.

That observation brings me to the most important points about this book. I may have more to say about the details in a future post, but it is vital to understand the overall process and how Mueller’s and Zebley’s conservatism led to a flawed process and failed report.

The harsh and ugly truth is that the presidency, in the wrong hands, gave the subject of the investigation an unequaled power to influence the behavior of witnesses, principally in this case Paul Manafort, but others as well. One such influence is the pardon power that Trump unsubtly dangled to assure witnesses that if they remained loyal to him, even to the extent of repeatedly lying to the investigators, they would be spared any consequences. And we know that this was a situation where loyalty to Trump was indeed rewarded with pardons or commuted sentences– for Manafort, for Flynn, for Stone, for Bannon, for Papadopoulos and others. https://bit.ly/3hfx7O3

The other major influence was Trump’s ability to fire the Special Counsel and thus end the investigation. If Mueller’s fears about this were based on the idea that the Republican Party (his party) would not hold Trump to account, he would have been right to be concerned. Nevertheless, Weissmann argues, persuasively, that the impact of this concern unduly colored many of the most important judgments made in the ultimate report.

Whether or not our skepticism is warranted, the book makes very clear that these two elements: Trump’s ability to pardon wrongdoers and his power to fire the Special Counsel, when used to serve Trump’s personal interest, are matters of the most profound concern for the future of our governance.

One of the most remarkable effects of this, when combined with the relentless attacks from the right-wing “media,” was that while Ivanka Trump, for example, almost certainly had relevant information about, for example, the Trump Tower meeting, the decision was that Ivanka was not to be interviewed. Weissmann at 117-118. Don Jr similarly could have been subpoenaed after refusing to be interviewed, but this was not done either. Weissman at 118. Astonishing. Fear of being fired also impacted decisions regarding how broadly to look into Trump’s finances in search of indirect Russian contributions (the Deutsche Bank subpoenas, for example, still not fully fleshed out). Weissmann at 147-148.

It is clear that Trump’s willingness to, directly and indirectly, threaten the Special Counsel with termination had major effects on the scope and aggression of the investigation. That reality explains many of the obvious and serious defects in Mueller’s final report discussed in detail in my earlier blog posts and exposed by Weissmann’s inside knowledge.

Weissmann demonstrates a clear-eyed understanding of the extent of Donald Trump’s corruption: “One cannot plausibly deny that Trump was seeking foreign assistance from Russia and was open to accepting it if offered.” Weissmann at 126, 135, 140. He labels Trump a continuing “counterintelligence threat.” As long as he remains free and unindicted for his multiple crimes in office, Trump remains such a threat despite his lazy indifference to national security briefings that have been a daily staple in the lives of presidents for a very long time. He knows a lot that would be valuable to our adversaries. Continuing through to the end of his presidency, Trump never acted against the Russian interference that was proven to continue into the 2020 campaigns. Weissmann at 218-219, 222. The book lays out a stark and disturbing list of failures to confront the Russian interference threat. Weissmann at 224.

Similarly, Weissmann describes how Rick Gates was aggressively pressured by Paul Manafort and unnamed others to refuse cooperation to the investigation. Weissmann at 206-208. The prospect of a pardon from Trump was part of the “package” of sweeteners to keep Gates quiet. Ultimately, the pressure failed to silence Gates, but just barely.

One particularly interesting story involved Manafort ginning up attacks from Fox’s Sean Hannity against the Special Counsel investigation in violation of the trial judge’s bail orders that had permitted Manafort to remain free pending trial. The investigators correlated Manafort’s texts to Hannity with on-air smears of Mueller and staff. Aaron Zebley, however, prevented the submission of the texts to the court, saying, “they are too explosive.” Weissmann at 209.

Much of the story of the Mueller investigation reads like the script of a television drama series. Typically, parts of such plots are so over the top, so corrupt and malign that they strain credulity. Trump, however, must have studied those shows because his conduct with people like White House counsel McGahn showed a willingness to flout the law at will. Trump never believed, and likely still does not believe, that he can be held accountable. He genuinely believes he is above the law and able, as he said, “to do whatever I want.”

Skipping much material that I may cover in a future post, Weissmann’s narrative ends full circle, reviewing then-Attorney General Barr’s letter purporting to summarize the Mueller Report, but which in fact was a green light to unleash Trump’s corruption in full and unrestrained flower. It led directly to the Ukraine extortion attempt that led to Trump’s first impeachment. Weissmann at 331. And to Giuliani, Nunes, and the political forgiveness of Roger Stone and Michael Flynn, that Weissmann refers to as the “gaggle of presidential defenders and conspirators.” At 332.

Weissmann surgically dissects Barr’s falsities, noting, for example, that Barr’s claim that the president had “full cooperated” with the investigation “”is not just untrue, it’s astonishingly far from the truth.” Weissmann at 333. The same for Barr’s claim that Trump had not asserted presidential privilege to withhold information.  And the same for Barr’s assertion that Trump had formed a “sincere belief” that his presidency was being undermined by the investigation, a claim whose provenance was never explained and in any case was irrelevant to the question whether Trump had obstructed justice.  Weissmann rips Barr’s claim that the Russian active measures were directed at “social discord” rather than helping Trump defeat Hillary Clinton. Lie after lie after lie.

Weissman concludes with some recommendations for ways to strengthen the Special Counsel regulations but, more importantly, disputes compellingly the DOJ policy, adhered to strictly by Mueller, that if the president could not be indicted, it was improper to accuse him of wrongdoing. Weissman at 342. A sitting president can indeed defend himself if he chooses to do so. The policy makes no sense. I addressed the no-indictment policy in a prior post on this blog.

Finally, and perhaps most important of all, Weissman notes that the presidential pardon power in the Constitution should not be used to protect the president personally by, in effect, covering up the crimes of others who would, absent the pardon power, have incriminating information on the sitting president. He argues that it should be unconstitutional for a president to use the pardon power to protect himself, independent of whether that power could be used to directly pardon himself. Weissmann at 344. That seems exactly right to me, although I have some doubts that the “conservative” majority now on the Supreme Court wouldn’t just take the simple-minded approach that the words conferring the pardon authority contain no limitations and therefore are absolute. That is a view that would further cement the anti-Constitutional idea of the imperial presidency that Trump tried to impose on the country. We can see in the events of January 6, among many other examples, where that leads.

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Links to Posts re Mueller Investigation:

Mueller’s Indictment of Russia Hackers   https://bit.ly/3gQe7Xb    July 13, 2018

Mueller’s Indictment of Russia Hackers – Updated  https:://bit.ly/3h33lvl July 14, 2018

The Mueller Report – Where From Here? https://bit.ly/3gZQElm   March 24, 2019

Semi-Final Thoughts on Mueller Report https://bit.ly/3j8gVRh  March 25, 2019

Issues raised by Mueller/Barr/Rosenstein https://bit.ly/3wSPjni March 27, 2019

Redactions of Mueller Report Must Be Coded  https://bit.ly/3j8nX8q April 6, 2019

MUELLER REPORT PART I – TRUMP CANOODLING WITH RUSSIA https://bit.ly/3jeBNGr  July 9, 2019

MUELLER REPORT PART I — TRUMP CANOODLING WITH RUSSIA – A https://bit.ly/3dagOkk  July 10, 2019

MUELLER REPORT PART I – TRUMP CANOODLING WITH RUSSIA – B https://bit.ly/3zNATqe  July 10, 2019

MUELLER REPORT PART I – TRUMP CANOODLING WITH RUSSIA – C  https://bit.ly/3xTRsPI  July 11, 2019

MUELLER REPORT PART I – TRUMP CANOODLING WITH RUSSIA – D  https://bit.ly/3vUR1D9  July 11, 2019

MUELLER REPORT PART I – TRUMP CANOODLING WITH RUSSIA – E https://bit.ly/2U46bIX  July 11, 2019

Mueller Report Part II – Trump Guilty of Obstruction of Justice-A   https://bit.ly/3gQAXOu   July 23, 2019

Mueller Report Part II – Trump Guilty of Obstruction of Justice-B, C  https://bit.ly/3A5gf5l   July 23, 2019

Mueller Report Part II – Trump Guilty of Obstruction of Justice – D    https://bit.ly/3wVcw8l   July 23, 2019

Mueller Report Part II – Trump Guilty of Obstruction of Justice-E   https://bit.ly/3gRyKlW  July 23, 2019

Mueller Report Part II – Trump Guilty of Obstruction of Justice – F   https://bit.ly/3gRHR61  July 23, 2019

MUELLER REPORT PART I – TRUMP CANOODLING WITH RUSSIA – E

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E. Evidence of Conspiracy Everywhere But No Conspiracy?

It also seems very significant that all evidence regarding Manafort’s communications with Russians could not be seen because it was encrypted and that Manafort lied to the Grand Jury and to the SCO about, among other things, the Campaign data he fed to Kilimnik. I-MR 130. Trump himself had the usual memory failure regarding the changes made to the Republican Platform dealing with the Ukraine.  I-MR 130, n. 841.

It follows that Mueller never really got to the bottom of Campaign connections with Russia. The investigation could not resolve, for example, what happened to the polling data that Manafort gave to Kilimnik. I-MR 131. SCO concluded Kilimnik, who was long-term employee of Manafort, was connected to Russian intelligence. I-MR 133. In the end, however, Mueller simply concludes that the investigation found no evidence of a connection between Manafort’s sharing of polling data with Kilimnik or that Manafort otherwise coordinated with Russia regarding the Campaign. Given the holes in the evidence, it is difficult to see how this conclusion is justified. Recall Mueller’s early warning that the absence of evidence is not evidence of the absence.

Note that Manafort worked for Campaign without pay even though he had no meaningful income at the time, allegedly (by Gates) because he expected to monetize his relationship with the Trump administration after the election. I-MR 135.

WHY, however, was the sending of internal polling data about the Campaign not an act of coordination that would have aided the Russians in their campaign to assist Trump by, for example, timing of document releases?  Moreover, Manafort offered “private briefings” to billionaire tycoon Oleg Deripaska (but, once questioned, said it was just about “public campaign matters).”  I-MR 137. Of course, Manafort would claim that, but what sense does that make? Surely, Deripaska could find out all the “public” campaign information he desired from the Russian intelligence agencies or other Russian sources. WHY did Mueller not explain this?  Deripaska now, of course, denies almost everything regarding his interest in American politics and refused to cooperate with Mueller’s investigation. https://nyti.ms/2WJC7Tz

At a dinner August 2, 2016, Manafort briefed Kilimnik on Campaign plans in four battleground states (MI, MN, PA, WI). I-MR 140. WHY is this not an act of coordination, since Manafort knew and expected Kilimnik to report to Russians with an interest in the election? What alternative explanation is there other than some vague notion that providing this information would endear Russians to Manafort, help get his Ukraine consulting bills paid and generally enhance his standing with Russians interested in removing US sanctions? Even if that was Manafort’s only motivation, the fact remains that these acts would have the natural effect of facilitating any Russian actions related to election interference which was found to be based on supporting Trump over Clinton. Manafort likely knew that — he and Gates left the Aug. 2 dinner separate from Kilimnik to avoid media attention to their relationship. I-MR 141

The Report concludes that it found no evidence that Manafort brought Kilimnik’s Ukraine peace plan to the attention of the Trump Campaign or the Trump Administration, yet says Kilimnik continued promoting the plan to the State Dept into the summer of 2018.  I-MR 144. Since at that time the State Department was under the control of the Trump Administration, why would Mueller distinguish the State Department from the Administration?

The Report, at I-MR 144, notes that immediately after the election Russians connected with the Russian government began outreaches to the Trump Administration but through business rather than political channels. The implication of this statement seems to be that using business channels somehow distinguishes the outreach from conspiratorial implications. But using business channels makes perfect sense, considering that Trump was not a politician and was, for the most part, not surrounded by politicians in his Campaign organization. Those realities should not affect the interpretation of the purpose of the Russian contacts.

The Report discussion on Russian government outreach begins with Hope Hicks receiving a personal cell phone call at 3 am on election night from what turned out to be Sergey Kuznetzov at the Russian Embassy in DC with a message from Putin to Trump. I-MR 145. HOW did Kuznetzov have Hicks’ personal cell phone number? Mueller never addresses that question.

Shortly before Kuznetzov’s outreach, an unidentified person [redacted for Investigative Technique] wrote to Kirill Dmitriev that “Putin has won.” I-MR 149. This odd message is not further elaborated.

The Report details at length the numerous efforts of various Russian parties to contact the incoming administration and the Trump team’s complete willingness to engage immediately despite the well-established principle that the US has only one president at a time.

Another curious development was that despite Kushner’s initial resistance to meeting with Kislyak, his immediate acceptance of a meeting with Sergey Gorkov, the head of Vnesheconombank, a Russian government-owned bank then under American sanctions stemming from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, led to Kushner and Gorkov telling two completely different stories about what they discussed. I-MR 163. The Report notes that this conflict was never resolved but Mueller was unconcerned because there was no evidence of further discussions between the two men. However, Kushner’s assistant refused a second meeting request from Gorkov because of publicity about the Russia investigation, allegedly without even telling Kushner about the request. I-MR 163. The inference from all this is that everyone in the Trump team was acting independently, not talking with other members of the team even about extremely sensitive matters such as repeated outreaches to them by Russian operatives. Is this plausible?

Regarding the sanctions on Russia for election interference, Michael Flynn, allegedly acting on his own, proposed to Ambassador Kislyak that Russia not escalate the situation, a proposal that was accepted. I-MR 167. WHY is this not coordination even by Mueller’s limited definition? Perhaps because Trump was already President-Elect, but then why so much Report space devoted to post-election activities by Russians reaching out to Trump administration? If Mueller was really looking for post-election evidence of pre-election coordination, there were many curious situations that needed explanation and didn’t get one.

Mueller appears to believe that actions by Trump staff are not a problem for Trump unless Trump personally asked them to take an inappropriate action. BUT WHY is that so, when almost all actions by any administration are taken by staff and most of the time the President is not personally involved in details of who speaks with whom?

The Report portrays the Russians as a bunch of neophyte amateurs at sleuthing, the Keystone Kops of international conspiring. Is it plausible to believe that Vladimir Putin, a former KGB agent with all the resources of the Russian intelligence apparatus at his instant disposal, did not know how to contact high level people in the incoming Trump administration? 

When Egypt proposed a UN resolution calling on Israel to stop settlements in Palestinian territory, the Trump team, not yet in power, worked with foreign governments, including Russia to defeat the resolution, knowing that the Obama Administration would not oppose it. I-MR 168. WHY is this not giving aid and comfort to an enemy of the US? WHY was this not “coordination” under Mueller’s own definition of conspiracy?

Mueller treats this as just routine despite its breach of a long-standing practice/policy/principle that we have one president at a time.  Why is working directly with foreign governments to defeat the policies of the sitting administration, without registration or other public disclosure, not tantamount to treason if not actually treason? Trump personally participated in this when he stated publicly that he was opposed to the sanctions imposed by Obama Administration. I-MR 169.

Transition Team members continued to talk among themselves about how to deter Russians from responding adversely to the Obama sanctions. I-MR 170. The Campaign thus was plotting to undermine the Obama foreign policy position on Russia sanctions, with Obama still in office, without any attempt to consult with Obama or his staff about why sanctions were imposed. Trump was personally briefed by KT McFarland, during which Trump disputed that Russians had interfered with the election, a conclusion that the Mueller investigation demolished. I-MR 171. Trump was personally aware that a member of the Transition Team, who else but Flynn, would be talking with Kislyak that very evening. Russians, on direct order of Putin, did not retaliate regarding the sanctions. Flynn told Mueller he did not document his contacts with Kislyak because he knew they were interfering with Obama administration foreign policy. I-MR 172.

Ultimately, Mueller uses ambiguous language to conclude that there were no chargeable crimes involving Campaign people. Although the Campaign was “receptive to the offer,” the “investigation did not establish that the Campaign coordinated or conspired with the Russian government in its election-interference activities.” I-MR 173.  No charge, for example, re Internet Research Agency election actions because Mueller had no evidence that Campaign people knew they were interacting with Russians engaged in a criminal conspiracy. I-MR 175. Who, then, did they think they were dealing with? Why are these adults not to be held accountable for their deliberate conduct while turning a blind eye to the reality behind the mask? Mueller never explained his generous treatment of the Campaign and its leader when it came to their refusal to see what was plainly in front of them.

Part of the problem here, it seems, is that Congress has not updated the National Stolen Property Act to include electronic information. See I-MR 176, n. 1278. And, redactions based on extensive Harm to Ongoing Matters in the section addressing indictments indicate that there are major important cases still under active investigation. See I-MR 176-180, 183-184

The Mueller Report explanation of the failure to charge certain criminal offenses is lacking in meaningful detail. The decision was based mainly on the belief that evidence of offenses under campaign finance laws, in particular the Trump Tower meeting re Clinton’s emails, could not establish that participants “willfully” violated the law. I-MR 180. The conclusions that no Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) violations could be proved against Papadopoulos and Page, for example, were stated in a summary way without detailed explanation of why their many contacts with Russia nationals during the campaign did not involve, at least, attempts to violate the FARA.  See I-MR 183.

Mueller notes Papadopoulos’ lies about when he heard from Mifsud that the Russians had dirt on Clinton and that he understood that Mifsud was connected at high levels in the Russian government. He also lied about when he met Olga Polonskaya, whom he also believed was well connected with Russian government officials at a high level. I-MR 193. The result, however, was that Papadopoulos was charged with making false statements but his activities were not imputed to the campaign. Is it plausible to believe that an ambitious person like Papadopoulos was not reporting his activities to others in the Campaign even if only orally?

 Michael Flynn also lied about, among several things, his contacts with Ambassador Kislyak which were made in close contact with KT McFarland, then a “senior Transition Team official.” I-MR 194. Again, despite the close coordination with McFarland, Mueller showed no appetite for attributing any intentionality or responsibility to the Campaign or the Transition Team for the unexplained coverup of Flynn’s contacts with the Russians.

Note, on the other hand, that in the discussion of false statements by various figures in the Trump Campaign and/or Transition Team, there are two major redactions including the name of the individual involved: one based on grand jury testimony (I-MR 194) and the other involving Harm to an Ongoing Matter (I-MR 196-197). This strongly suggests there are additional potential cases of lying to the government still being investigated by some element of the federal government. Mueller should provide some explanation of the further work to be done, given his decision to terminate his office’s work.

Mueller also gives Jeff Sessions the benefit of the doubt even when Sessions, fully aware of the broad inquiry into cooperation with Russia, chose to interpret questions as calling for the narrowest possible construction. Mueller concludes that the evidence did not establish that Sessions was “willfully untruthful.” I-MR 198. If not, then what was it? Unintentional untruthfulness?

Mueller notes that the proof of a willful violation of FARA requires some defendant knowledge of the law. I-MR 185. Mueller seems to believe that none of the lobbyists and other experts that Trump enlisted to help him knew anything about the law governing acting on behalf of a foreign government to influence an election. Even a modicum of common sense would suggest, at a minimum, that lawyers be consulted in such circumstances. Willful ignorance does not excuse a law violation, as anyone can attest who has been ticketed for speeding and claimed not to see, for example, the School Zone signs. The principle of “knew or should have known” should apply here and, if not, there should be an explanation of why it is not applicable.

The gaping holes in the analysis of the facts suggest that some parts of the investigation were very broad but not very deep in key areas. Rather than take an aggressive approach, Mueller seems to have been concerned more about losing a case than about securing prosecution of people who actively worked to subvert a national election by seeking help from a hostile foreign power.

END OF CONSIDERATION OF MUELLER REPORT PART 1

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COMING SOON – PART II: DID THE PRESIDENT COMMIT THE CRIME OF OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE?

 

 

MUELLER REPORT PART I – TRUMP CANOODLING WITH RUSSIA – C

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C. Campaign Officials Suffering from Failed Memories at Critical Times

George Papadopoulos was working toward a London meeting of Campaign officials with Putin staff that would be not openly endorsed by Trump. I-MR 92. Interestingly, Papadopoulos “declined to assist in deciphering his notes” about the TAG meeting and the London meeting plan. I-MR 91, n. 489. Clovis claimed not to recall attending the TAG meeting even though he was photographed sitting next to Papadopoulos. I-MR 91. Papadopoulos was dismissed from Campaign a few months later after an interview with the Russian news agency Interfax wherein he complained about the effect of Obama’s sanctions on Russia and drew unwanted attention to the developing relationship with Russia. I-MR 93, n. 493

 One of the most interesting aspects of the Report is that, when crucial issues were raised with various members of the Campaign, they experienced memory failure. This happens again and again in the investigation. A glaring and important example relates to whether Papadopoulos, having seemingly constant though irregular communications with Campaign officials about his efforts to link the Campaign with Russian support, told anyone on the Campaign staff that the Russians claimed to have email dirt on Clinton.

Papadopoulos wasn’t sure and Stephen Miller and Clovis both could not recall hearing this extraordinary information. While the Report says that no documentary evidence, including emails, showed that Papadopoulos shared the information with the Campaign, it strains credulity to believe that Papadopoulos kept this claim to himself throughout the summer when he was working so hard to convince the Campaign of the value of his Russia connections. It is also not surprising that there was no documentary evidence because the nature of the secret and the warnings from Campaign staff about the sensitivity of the Russia connection, documented in the Report would naturally lead to avoiding the creation of a paper trail.

Papadopoulos also had memory loss when questioned about his relationship with Sergei Millian, who claimed to be the head of the New York-based Russian American Chamber of Commerce. I-MR 94. Curiously, that organization’s website states that the “Chairman and Founder” of the RACC is Yelena Brezhneva. https://raccnv.com/about-us  On LinkedIn, she is listed as a real estate investment advisor in Las Vegas and also founder of the RACC. Millian is nowhere mentioned.

Millian had offered Papadopoulos access to “disruptive technology that might be instrumental in your political work for the campaign.” Trump campaign official Bo Denysyk declined Papadopoulos’ offer to connect him with Millian because there was already to much media attention to Trump’s enthusiasm for Russia. I-MR 94. There is no report about Papadopoulos’ specific response to the offer of “disruptive technology,” which is a strange omission and not explained anywhere in the Report.

The consideration of the Papadopoulos – Millian connection dries up despite further meetings between the two, in part because Millian remained out of the country during the investigation and refused requests to be interviewed. I-MR 94. It appears that Mueller simply gave up on this line of inquiry. Why?

The other point to be made here is that the Campaign people likely were aware that a lie about some action could be found out, with legal consequences for the liars (ask Michael Flynn and Michael Cohen), but a statement that “I don’t remember” is virtually bullet-proof unless extrinsic evidence exists that the person does remember; such situations are rare.

While there are substantial Grand Jury-based redactions related to Carter Page’s activities in Russia, the Report ultimately concludes that Page’s activities “were not fully explained,” suggesting there was more to be learned but for redacted reasons, there was no further opportunity. I-MR 101. Why?

As with Papadopoulos, the media focused on Page’s Russia activities in the post Republican Convention period and by late September, he was dismissed from the Campaign amidst denials from the Campaign that he had a meaningful role. I-MR 102

The pattern seemed to be that the Campaign was comfortable with the efforts of Papadopoulos and Page to generate contacts in Russia as long as it was not publicly exposed; when it was exposed, they were ousted from the Campaign. Hope Hicks issued a directive that the Campaign was to deny Page had a role even after he was announced as foreign policy advisor in March 2016. Allegedly, he was paid to do nothing for six months, then fired. There is no discussion of the Campaign payrolls to show how much Papadopoulos and Page were paid or whether there was documentation of expenses reimbursed by the Campaign. WHY is this obvious investigative technique not at least mentioned?

 Finally, let’s not forget that Jeff Sessions, Trump’s pick for Attorney General until Sessions recused himself and refused Trump’s demands to un-recuse, also could not remember what he spoke with Russian Ambassador Kislyak about at the Global Partners in Diplomacy event. I-MR 123. I understand that these oh so very important people meet so many other very important people that they can’t remember every conversation, but Kislyak was the Russian Ambassador. I, at least, believe it is more than a little odd, that Sessions could not remember anything substantive about their interaction. Maybe I just haven’t met enough very important people.

Next: The Curious Handling of the Trump Tower Meeting

 

MUELLER REPORT PART I – TRUMP CANOODLING WITH RUSSIA – B

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B. Involvement of WikiLeaks –Gaping Holes & Unresolved Issues

Immediately after the Billy Bush “grab ‘em” video, WikiLeaks released more stolen documents. How was WikiLeaks kept on such a short leash that it twice responded to developments in the US campaign by releasing documents intended to harm Clinton and offset self-inflicted harm by Trump?  Who was the link and why was the investigation ended before this party was run to ground?  [It may have been Roger Stone who is the subject of ongoing investigation covered by multiple Report redactions] GRU[1] and WikiLeaks were working together and hiding communications so that SCO efforts to collect them all were frustrated. I-MR 45. Mueller was never able to identify individuals other than Assange who were part of the DCLeaks/WikiLeaks coordination of anti-Clinton activities.

This leaves a gaping hole in the results of the investigation and raises the question why the investigation was ended before it was completed. If further efforts to identify individuals other than Assange were likely to be futile, this should have been explained.

Is it plausible that all the lying by Campaign people, I-MR 9-10, was all driven by the concern that the close association of the Campaign to Russians looked bad and was not also to cover up some deeper relationships instigated and nurtured by the Russians who had independent reasons to prefer Trump in the White House rather than the more experienced Hillary Clinton? The Russians are reputedly pretty good at dark statecraft and would likely not have made the trail easy to follow.

 We should not overlook the reasons stated by Mueller that the investigation was incomplete, including:  (1) Fifth Amendment claims by witnesses; (2) some information was “presumptively privileged,” a questionable conclusion not thoroughly explained or developed in the Report; (3) witnesses and documents outside U.S. jurisdiction; (4) some information was deleted by Trump Campaign people under investigation; some information was encrypted or simply not retained.  I-MR 10.

 Given the statement that it is possible that such information would have changed conclusions in some cases, WHY does Report not detail all instances in which (1) witnesses claimed the Fifth Amendment against self-incrimination; (2) information was deleted or (3) encrypted information was withheld?

This also raises questions about the basis for wrapping up the investigation when it was. Mueller refers to it being “late” but no explanation for that is given. Late in relation to what? If there was a deadline, what was it, who imposed it, and when was it imposed?

 Russian involvement in the 2016 election clearly had an impact; Mueller estimated tens of millions of people were exposed to fake social media information and Russian organized rallies. I-MR 26, 29. Yet, no effort was made to conclude how big an effect resulted.

 Note that Mueller did not investigate deeply the GRU intrusion into state/local administration of elections, observing that FBI, DHS and state authorities are investigating. I-MR 50.

WHAT is the status of those investigations? These activities occurred in 2016 – three years ago! Many of the states where the impacts might have been greatest were controlled by Republicans who showed no interest in protecting the electoral process from Russian interference; indeed, the record outside the Mueller investigation plainly shows multiple efforts at voter suppression in such states, all aimed at reducing Democratic voter turnout.

 The section of I-MR addressing Trump Campaign interest in WikiLeaks’ use of Russian hacked documents is heavily redacted with Harm to Ongoing Matter, indicating active investigation somewhere in the US government is continuing. I-MR 51 et seq. Again, this was some years ago. What is going on with those investigations?

Trump was personally interested in the missing Clinton emails and frustrated they had not been found. I-MR 52. Manafort was particularly interested in Clinton emails as well. I-MR 52-53. By late summer 2016, the Trump Campaign was planning a press/communications strategy based on expected further leaks of Clinton documents from Wikileaks. I-MR 54. How did Trump know this? Who was providing Trump with direct information about WikiLeaks’ plans for further document dumps? Much of the evidence is heavily redacted, but Trump had links to WikiLeaks that were producing information for him. If Campaign was planning strategy based on WikiLeaks release of Russian-stolen documents, why is this not “coordination” or at least attempted coordination with Russian hacking activities, using Mueller’s own restrictive definition? Again, no explanation.

At I-MR 59-60, there is explicit evidence of Donald Trump Jr conspiring with WikiLeaks to promote a false narrative regarding Hillary Clinton. WHY is this not overt evidence of coordination with Russians through WikiLeaks as intermediary? How can Mueller conclude, at I-MR 61, that there was no evidence of coordination between Russia and Trump campaign regarding the effort to recover Clinton’s missing 30,000 emails.

I-MR 61-62 has a discussion of Henry Oknyansky’s alleged effort to sell dirt on Clinton, promoted by Michael Caputo but concludes that information about the events was conflicted, that Alexei Rasin, who was claimed to have the information could not be found, and that the investigation could not determine the content or origin of the information. Therefore, the conclusion was that there was no evidence of a connection with Russia and this particular set of claimed dirt on Clinton. BUT this is largely inconclusive. There was much smoke but no fire could be found. As noted at outset by Mueller, the absence of evidence does not prove the absence of the fact in question.

I-MR 62-64 discusses Peter Smith’s efforts to locate the Clinton emails, including explicit claims of coordination with the Trump organization, including Flynn, Bannon and Kellyanne Conway. Mueller seems to raise the bar regarding what is probative evidence when he states that the investigation did not find evidence that any of the Trump people “initiated or directed” Smith’s work. If, for example, Bannon or Conway knew about Smith’s work and encouraged it without initiating or directing it, WHY would that not qualify as “coordination?” This is not explained. At I-MR 65, the ultimate conclusion was, in substance, that Smith had fabricated his claims of being in contact with the Russian hackers and that he had acquired the missing emails. But the key issue here is Trump Campaign coordination, not whether people like Smith were overstating what they knew.

 It has been suggested that all of this is just the work of a bunch of small-time hustlers trying to get in on the Trump action. https://bit.ly/2RWv1FT That may be true, but given that the control of the highest political office in the country was at stake, all of this smoke deserves the deepest scrutiny. The story here remains incomplete. Mueller elected to treat conflicted information as essentially neutral, giving equal weight to the “no coordination evidence.” This approach is not required in these circumstances and, given all the lying and withholding going on about the Russian connection throughout the Campaign, there is no apparent reason to treat conflicted evidence as neutral.

Mueller showed little interest in attempted conspiracy between Trump organization and Russia-connected individuals. For example, in fn 288 Mueller states that a Russian internet newspaper registered names for Trump2016.ru and DonaldTrump2016. Ru, then requested an interview by email to Hope Hicks. Mueller concludes this part of the narrative with “No interview took place.” Fine, BUT what was Hicks’ response to the email request and why is that not set out in the Report?

George Papadopoulos attended a March 31, 2016, meeting with Trump & Jeff Sessions, among others, and came away with impression that Trump, and possibly Sessions (some conflict re Sessions position) favored getting a meeting with Vladimir Putin. He pursued the idea through Joseph Mifsud and made many contacts with Russian-govt affiliated individuals. In the course of that work, he was told by Mifsud that the Russians had email dirt on Clinton. I-MR 89. On May 6, Papadopoulos told an unidentified representative of a foreign govt about the damaging emails that Russia wanted to use to hurt Clinton’s electoral chances. On July 26, 2016, after the WikiLeaks email dump, that foreign govt informed the FBI which then opened its investigation into Russian interference in the election.

At no time did Papadopoulos tell the FBI what he had learned. WHY was Papadopoulos not charged with aiding a foreign govt in defrauding the U.S.?? Papadopoulos was working for the Trump campaign at that time and had alerted the campaign about Russian interest in Trump. He believed that the Campaign wanted him to pursue the lead. What was the source of that belief? At the very least this should have been fully explained in the Report.

 Thru the spring/summer 2016, Papadopoulos kept Campaign officials aware of his efforts to arrange a meeting in Moscow with Putin thru emails to at least Lewandowski, Clovis (co-chair of Trump Campaign) and Manafort. I-MR 89. The Report barely mentions responses from any of these people. WHY?  Papadopoulos eventually suggested he personally could attend Russia meetings on behalf of the Campaign “off the record.” I-MR 90. This is an act of concealment, from which a reasonable inference can be drawn that the parties knew what they were doing was wrong.

Next: Campaign Officials Suffering from Failed Memories at Critical Times

[1] A military intelligence agency called the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, or GRU.

 

MUELLER REPORT PART I – TRUMP CANOODLING WITH RUSSIA – A

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A. Collusion vs. Conspiracy – Setting a High and Unnecessary Threshold of Proof

The investigation focused on conspiracy law because “collusion” is not in a term used in the governing criminal law. That fact may explain why Trump constantly refers to collusion in defending his conduct. While it’s technically true that the Report did not find “collusion” between the Trump Campaign and the Russian Government, the Report did not make a lot of other findings because they were equally as irrelevant as “collusion.”  For example, the Report did not find that Donald Trump is a generous person who readily contributes substantial amounts of his claimed fortune to charitable causes. Such a finding would have been (a)  untrue and (b) utterly irrelevant to the matters under investigation.

On the relevant issue of conspiracy, the Report focused on “coordination” as a factual question — limited to whether an “agreement — tacit or express — between the Trump Campaign and the Russian government” existed during the Campaign or the transition. Why Mueller thought this limitation was essential to the investigation and to any charging decisions is never explained.

It was entirely possible for the Trump Campaign to “coordinate” without an “agreement” to do so. Given Mueller’s expressed conclusion that the Campaign expected to benefit from information stolen by the Russians and the clearly established fact that high-ranking members of the Trump Campaign and family actively sought “dirt” possessed by Russia on the Clinton candidacy, “coordination” within the meaning of the conspiracy laws should not turn on the existence of an “agreement,” tacit or otherwise.

Framing the problem as Mueller did sets a bar so high that a successful investigation was likely impossible. As bad as Russia’s demonstrated electoral interference was, it was entirely feasible that “coordination” by the Trump Campaign with the Russian activities could have been accomplished without anything resembling an “agreement” between the Campaign and the Russian government. Mueller owes an explanation of why the existence of an agreement was essential to a finding of conspiracy. Would mere knowledge of what the other side was doing suffice to establish such an “agreement?” Mueller apparently thought not, but the underlying reasoning for such a counter-intuitive judgment is missing. Conspiracies are typically very hard to prove, but there was no apparent or compelling reason to get the bar so high.

Although Russians masked their operation while conducting political rallies and in doing so “made contact with…Trump campaign officials,” Mueller says the investigation uncovered no evidence of “coordination.” I-MR 4 This cries out for elaboration. Which rallies and which campaign officials? When? Are we to believe that the Trump campaign worked with unknown parties to stage political rallies and never bothered to find out with whom they were working?

A related curiosity is the question of timing the decision to end the investigation. The Report notes (I-MR 14) that the Russians masked their identity in communications with the Trump Campaign but some of those contacts are still under investigation. Per Appendix D at I-MR D-1 thru D-6, there may be as many as 14 additional investigations pending but no details or clues are provided regarding their targets or subject matter. The massive redactions from I-MR 14 to I-MR 37 suggest that the primary subject matter may be Russian interference in the election unrelated specifically to possible coordination with the Trump Campaign, but, if so, this should be clarified.

The Report says Russians released hacked materials about Clinton through Wikileaks (I-MR 4), thus implicitly indicating that Julian Assange conspired with the Russians. Mueller concedes the SCO was unable to resolve the connection between the release of the Trump “grab ‘em” tape and the same-day release of WikiLeaks documents harmful to Clinton. I-MR 36. But what was Assange’s relationship to the Trump Campaign? This is not elaborated in the Report.

 Trump personally welcomed help from WikiLeaks and the Russians. He later claimed he was speaking sarcastically, but when, in relation to investigation steps, did he make the sarcasm claim?  This is a common Trump tactic – make a dog whistle statement followed by “I was just joking” when blowback ensues.

In June 2016 a Redacted Party predicted to the Trump Campaign that WikiLeaks would release info damaging to Clinton. I-MR 5. There is more here that needs explanation to sustain the conclusion that there was no evidence of coordination.

The Report portrays the involvement of Russia and Trump Campaign’s response as having same goals – each would benefit from the other’s success – but Mueller nonetheless concludes that throughout the entire campaign, the parties somehow operated independently, though in parallel, to each other’s activities without any coordination. I-MR 5. He also concluded that Trump Campaign people did not understand they were dealing with Russians, I-MR 35, an idea that conflicts directly with the documentary prelude to the infamous Trump Tower meeting at which high Campaign officials attended in explicit expectation of receiving stolen negative information about Hillary Clinton.

During 2016, George Papadopoulos, while working for the Campaign, tried to arrange meetings to follow up information from Joseph Mifsud (identified by Mueller as a Russian agent) that Russia had dirt on Clinton. While no meetings may have resulted, why weren’t Papadopoulos’s activities at a minimum “attempts to coordinate” Is it plausible that he acted entirely on his own without communicating with other Campaign officials? What specific efforts were made to track down this crucial information? Why isn’t this covered in detail in the Report?

Indeed, why was the Trump Tower meeting not, by itself, a clear attempt to coordinate with Russia?  The information offering may have been a ruse but Campaign leaders didn’t know that and attended in expressed hopes of getting dirt on Clinton. They walked out only when the hoped-for dirt was not proffered. It’s pretty clear from the email history that if the dirt had been produced, it would have been accepted and not reported to the FBI.

Similarly, Carter Page was ousted from Campaign only after media attention drawn to his Russian connections. I-MR 6 If there had been no media attention, is there evidence the Campaign would have removed Page? Nothing in the Report suggests this would have occurred. Was there not more evidence of Page’s connections to Russia and, therefore, likely attempts to coordinate with it in support of Trump’s campaign?

Paul Manafort, then Trump Campaign Chairman, was also meeting with Konstantin Kilimnik, who had Russian intelligence contacts.  They discussed campaign strategy, including swaying Democratic voters in Midwest. Manafort shared polling data. I-MR 7 WHY is this not coordination even by Mueller’s limited definition? At the time Manafort was the trusted head of the Campaign. Why would his conduct not have been attributed to the Campaign? Why was this not addressed in the Report?

Next: Involvement of WikiLeaks –Gaping Holes & Unresolved Issues