Tag Archives: Hicks

MUELLER REPORT PART I – TRUMP CANOODLING WITH RUSSIA – E

E. Evidence of Conspiracy Everywhere But No Conspiracy?

It also seems very significant that all evidence regarding Manafort’s communications with Russians could not be seen because it was encrypted and that Manafort lied to the Grand Jury and to the SCO about, among other things, the Campaign data he fed to Kilimnik. I-MR 130. Trump himself had the usual memory failure regarding the changes made to the Republican Platform dealing with the Ukraine.  I-MR 130, n. 841.

It follows that Mueller never really got to the bottom of Campaign connections with Russia. The investigation could not resolve, for example, what happened to the polling data that Manafort gave to Kilimnik. I-MR 131. SCO concluded Kilimnik, who was long-term employee of Manafort, was connected to Russian intelligence. I-MR 133. In the end, however, Mueller simply concludes that the investigation found no evidence of a connection between Manafort’s sharing of polling data with Kilimnik or that Manafort otherwise coordinated with Russia regarding the Campaign. Given the holes in the evidence, it is difficult to see how this conclusion is justified. Recall Mueller’s early warning that the absence of evidence is not evidence of the absence.

Note that Manafort worked for Campaign without pay even though he had no meaningful income at the time, allegedly (by Gates) because he expected to monetize his relationship with the Trump administration after the election. I-MR 135.

WHY, however, was the sending of internal polling data about the Campaign not an act of coordination that would have aided the Russians in their campaign to assist Trump by, for example, timing of document releases?  Moreover, Manafort offered “private briefings” to billionaire tycoon Oleg Deripaska (but, once questioned, said it was just about “public campaign matters).”  I-MR 137. Of course, Manafort would claim that, but what sense does that make? Surely, Deripaska could find out all the “public” campaign information he desired from the Russian intelligence agencies or other Russian sources. WHY did Mueller not explain this?  Deripaska now, of course, denies almost everything regarding his interest in American politics and refused to cooperate with Mueller’s investigation. https://nyti.ms/2WJC7Tz

At a dinner August 2, 2016, Manafort briefed Kilimnik on Campaign plans in four battleground states (MI, MN, PA, WI). I-MR 140. WHY is this not an act of coordination, since Manafort knew and expected Kilimnik to report to Russians with an interest in the election? What alternative explanation is there other than some vague notion that providing this information would endear Russians to Manafort, help get his Ukraine consulting bills paid and generally enhance his standing with Russians interested in removing US sanctions? Even if that was Manafort’s only motivation, the fact remains that these acts would have the natural effect of facilitating any Russian actions related to election interference which was found to be based on supporting Trump over Clinton. Manafort likely knew that — he and Gates left the Aug. 2 dinner separate from Kilimnik to avoid media attention to their relationship. I-MR 141

The Report concludes that it found no evidence that Manafort brought Kilimnik’s Ukraine peace plan to the attention of the Trump Campaign or the Trump Administration, yet says Kilimnik continued promoting the plan to the State Dept into the summer of 2018.  I-MR 144. Since at that time the State Department was under the control of the Trump Administration, why would Mueller distinguish the State Department from the Administration?

The Report, at I-MR 144, notes that immediately after the election Russians connected with the Russian government began outreaches to the Trump Administration but through business rather than political channels. The implication of this statement seems to be that using business channels somehow distinguishes the outreach from conspiratorial implications. But using business channels makes perfect sense, considering that Trump was not a politician and was, for the most part, not surrounded by politicians in his Campaign organization. Those realities should not affect the interpretation of the purpose of the Russian contacts.

The Report discussion on Russian government outreach begins with Hope Hicks receiving a personal cell phone call at 3 am on election night from what turned out to be Sergey Kuznetzov at the Russian Embassy in DC with a message from Putin to Trump. I-MR 145. HOW did Kuznetzov have Hicks’ personal cell phone number? Mueller never addresses that question.

Shortly before Kuznetzov’s outreach, an unidentified person [redacted for Investigative Technique] wrote to Kirill Dmitriev that “Putin has won.” I-MR 149. This odd message is not further elaborated.

The Report details at length the numerous efforts of various Russian parties to contact the incoming administration and the Trump team’s complete willingness to engage immediately despite the well-established principle that the US has only one president at a time.

Another curious development was that despite Kushner’s initial resistance to meeting with Kislyak, his immediate acceptance of a meeting with Sergey Gorkov, the head of Vnesheconombank, a Russian government-owned bank then under American sanctions stemming from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, led to Kushner and Gorkov telling two completely different stories about what they discussed. I-MR 163. The Report notes that this conflict was never resolved but Mueller was unconcerned because there was no evidence of further discussions between the two men. However, Kushner’s assistant refused a second meeting request from Gorkov because of publicity about the Russia investigation, allegedly without even telling Kushner about the request. I-MR 163. The inference from all this is that everyone in the Trump team was acting independently, not talking with other members of the team even about extremely sensitive matters such as repeated outreaches to them by Russian operatives. Is this plausible?

Regarding the sanctions on Russia for election interference, Michael Flynn, allegedly acting on his own, proposed to Ambassador Kislyak that Russia not escalate the situation, a proposal that was accepted. I-MR 167. WHY is this not coordination even by Mueller’s limited definition? Perhaps because Trump was already President-Elect, but then why so much Report space devoted to post-election activities by Russians reaching out to Trump administration? If Mueller was really looking for post-election evidence of pre-election coordination, there were many curious situations that needed explanation and didn’t get one.

Mueller appears to believe that actions by Trump staff are not a problem for Trump unless Trump personally asked them to take an inappropriate action. BUT WHY is that so, when almost all actions by any administration are taken by staff and most of the time the President is not personally involved in details of who speaks with whom?

The Report portrays the Russians as a bunch of neophyte amateurs at sleuthing, the Keystone Kops of international conspiring. Is it plausible to believe that Vladimir Putin, a former KGB agent with all the resources of the Russian intelligence apparatus at his instant disposal, did not know how to contact high level people in the incoming Trump administration? 

When Egypt proposed a UN resolution calling on Israel to stop settlements in Palestinian territory, the Trump team, not yet in power, worked with foreign governments, including Russia to defeat the resolution, knowing that the Obama Administration would not oppose it. I-MR 168. WHY is this not giving aid and comfort to an enemy of the US? WHY was this not “coordination” under Mueller’s own definition of conspiracy?

Mueller treats this as just routine despite its breach of a long-standing practice/policy/principle that we have one president at a time.  Why is working directly with foreign governments to defeat the policies of the sitting administration, without registration or other public disclosure, not tantamount to treason if not actually treason? Trump personally participated in this when he stated publicly that he was opposed to the sanctions imposed by Obama Administration. I-MR 169.

Transition Team members continued to talk among themselves about how to deter Russians from responding adversely to the Obama sanctions. I-MR 170. The Campaign thus was plotting to undermine the Obama foreign policy position on Russia sanctions, with Obama still in office, without any attempt to consult with Obama or his staff about why sanctions were imposed. Trump was personally briefed by KT McFarland, during which Trump disputed that Russians had interfered with the election, a conclusion that the Mueller investigation demolished. I-MR 171. Trump was personally aware that a member of the Transition Team, who else but Flynn, would be talking with Kislyak that very evening. Russians, on direct order of Putin, did not retaliate regarding the sanctions. Flynn told Mueller he did not document his contacts with Kislyak because he knew they were interfering with Obama administration foreign policy. I-MR 172.

Ultimately, Mueller uses ambiguous language to conclude that there were no chargeable crimes involving Campaign people. Although the Campaign was “receptive to the offer,” the “investigation did not establish that the Campaign coordinated or conspired with the Russian government in its election-interference activities.” I-MR 173.  No charge, for example, re Internet Research Agency election actions because Mueller had no evidence that Campaign people knew they were interacting with Russians engaged in a criminal conspiracy. I-MR 175. Who, then, did they think they were dealing with? Why are these adults not to be held accountable for their deliberate conduct while turning a blind eye to the reality behind the mask? Mueller never explained his generous treatment of the Campaign and its leader when it came to their refusal to see what was plainly in front of them.

Part of the problem here, it seems, is that Congress has not updated the National Stolen Property Act to include electronic information. See I-MR 176, n. 1278. And, redactions based on extensive Harm to Ongoing Matters in the section addressing indictments indicate that there are major important cases still under active investigation. See I-MR 176-180, 183-184

The Mueller Report explanation of the failure to charge certain criminal offenses is lacking in meaningful detail. The decision was based mainly on the belief that evidence of offenses under campaign finance laws, in particular the Trump Tower meeting re Clinton’s emails, could not establish that participants “willfully” violated the law. I-MR 180. The conclusions that no Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) violations could be proved against Papadopoulos and Page, for example, were stated in a summary way without detailed explanation of why their many contacts with Russia nationals during the campaign did not involve, at least, attempts to violate the FARA.  See I-MR 183.

Mueller notes Papadopoulos’ lies about when he heard from Mifsud that the Russians had dirt on Clinton and that he understood that Mifsud was connected at high levels in the Russian government. He also lied about when he met Olga Polonskaya, whom he also believed was well connected with Russian government officials at a high level. I-MR 193. The result, however, was that Papadopoulos was charged with making false statements but his activities were not imputed to the campaign. Is it plausible to believe that an ambitious person like Papadopoulos was not reporting his activities to others in the Campaign even if only orally?

 Michael Flynn also lied about, among several things, his contacts with Ambassador Kislyak which were made in close contact with KT McFarland, then a “senior Transition Team official.” I-MR 194. Again, despite the close coordination with McFarland, Mueller showed no appetite for attributing any intentionality or responsibility to the Campaign or the Transition Team for the unexplained coverup of Flynn’s contacts with the Russians.

Note, on the other hand, that in the discussion of false statements by various figures in the Trump Campaign and/or Transition Team, there are two major redactions including the name of the individual involved: one based on grand jury testimony (I-MR 194) and the other involving Harm to an Ongoing Matter (I-MR 196-197). This strongly suggests there are additional potential cases of lying to the government still being investigated by some element of the federal government. Mueller should provide some explanation of the further work to be done, given his decision to terminate his office’s work.

Mueller also gives Jeff Sessions the benefit of the doubt even when Sessions, fully aware of the broad inquiry into cooperation with Russia, chose to interpret questions as calling for the narrowest possible construction. Mueller concludes that the evidence did not establish that Sessions was “willfully untruthful.” I-MR 198. If not, then what was it? Unintentional untruthfulness?

Mueller notes that the proof of a willful violation of FARA requires some defendant knowledge of the law. I-MR 185. Mueller seems to believe that none of the lobbyists and other experts that Trump enlisted to help him knew anything about the law governing acting on behalf of a foreign government to influence an election. Even a modicum of common sense would suggest, at a minimum, that lawyers be consulted in such circumstances. Willful ignorance does not excuse a law violation, as anyone can attest who has been ticketed for speeding and claimed not to see, for example, the School Zone signs. The principle of “knew or should have known” should apply here and, if not, there should be an explanation of why it is not applicable.

The gaping holes in the analysis of the facts suggest that some parts of the investigation were very broad but not very deep in key areas. Rather than take an aggressive approach, Mueller seems to have been concerned more about losing a case than about securing prosecution of people who actively worked to subvert a national election by seeking help from a hostile foreign power.

END OF CONSIDERATION OF MUELLER REPORT PART 1

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COMING SOON – PART II: DID THE PRESIDENT COMMIT THE CRIME OF OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE?

 

 

MUELLER REPORT PART I – TRUMP CANOODLING WITH RUSSIA – B

B. Involvement of WikiLeaks –Gaping Holes & Unresolved Issues

Immediately after the Billy Bush “grab ‘em” video, WikiLeaks released more stolen documents. How was WikiLeaks kept on such a short leash that it twice responded to developments in the US campaign by releasing documents intended to harm Clinton and offset self-inflicted harm by Trump?  Who was the link and why was the investigation ended before this party was run to ground?  [It may have been Roger Stone who is the subject of ongoing investigation covered by multiple Report redactions] GRU[1] and WikiLeaks were working together and hiding communications so that SCO efforts to collect them all were frustrated. I-MR 45. Mueller was never able to identify individuals other than Assange who were part of the DCLeaks/WikiLeaks coordination of anti-Clinton activities.

This leaves a gaping hole in the results of the investigation and raises the question why the investigation was ended before it was completed. If further efforts to identify individuals other than Assange were likely to be futile, this should have been explained.

Is it plausible that all the lying by Campaign people, I-MR 9-10, was all driven by the concern that the close association of the Campaign to Russians looked bad and was not also to cover up some deeper relationships instigated and nurtured by the Russians who had independent reasons to prefer Trump in the White House rather than the more experienced Hillary Clinton? The Russians are reputedly pretty good at dark statecraft and would likely not have made the trail easy to follow.

 We should not overlook the reasons stated by Mueller that the investigation was incomplete, including:  (1) Fifth Amendment claims by witnesses; (2) some information was “presumptively privileged,” a questionable conclusion not thoroughly explained or developed in the Report; (3) witnesses and documents outside U.S. jurisdiction; (4) some information was deleted by Trump Campaign people under investigation; some information was encrypted or simply not retained.  I-MR 10.

 Given the statement that it is possible that such information would have changed conclusions in some cases, WHY does Report not detail all instances in which (1) witnesses claimed the Fifth Amendment against self-incrimination; (2) information was deleted or (3) encrypted information was withheld?

This also raises questions about the basis for wrapping up the investigation when it was. Mueller refers to it being “late” but no explanation for that is given. Late in relation to what? If there was a deadline, what was it, who imposed it, and when was it imposed?

 Russian involvement in the 2016 election clearly had an impact; Mueller estimated tens of millions of people were exposed to fake social media information and Russian organized rallies. I-MR 26, 29. Yet, no effort was made to conclude how big an effect resulted.

 Note that Mueller did not investigate deeply the GRU intrusion into state/local administration of elections, observing that FBI, DHS and state authorities are investigating. I-MR 50.

WHAT is the status of those investigations? These activities occurred in 2016 – three years ago! Many of the states where the impacts might have been greatest were controlled by Republicans who showed no interest in protecting the electoral process from Russian interference; indeed, the record outside the Mueller investigation plainly shows multiple efforts at voter suppression in such states, all aimed at reducing Democratic voter turnout.

 The section of I-MR addressing Trump Campaign interest in WikiLeaks’ use of Russian hacked documents is heavily redacted with Harm to Ongoing Matter, indicating active investigation somewhere in the US government is continuing. I-MR 51 et seq. Again, this was some years ago. What is going on with those investigations?

Trump was personally interested in the missing Clinton emails and frustrated they had not been found. I-MR 52. Manafort was particularly interested in Clinton emails as well. I-MR 52-53. By late summer 2016, the Trump Campaign was planning a press/communications strategy based on expected further leaks of Clinton documents from Wikileaks. I-MR 54. How did Trump know this? Who was providing Trump with direct information about WikiLeaks’ plans for further document dumps? Much of the evidence is heavily redacted, but Trump had links to WikiLeaks that were producing information for him. If Campaign was planning strategy based on WikiLeaks release of Russian-stolen documents, why is this not “coordination” or at least attempted coordination with Russian hacking activities, using Mueller’s own restrictive definition? Again, no explanation.

At I-MR 59-60, there is explicit evidence of Donald Trump Jr conspiring with WikiLeaks to promote a false narrative regarding Hillary Clinton. WHY is this not overt evidence of coordination with Russians through WikiLeaks as intermediary? How can Mueller conclude, at I-MR 61, that there was no evidence of coordination between Russia and Trump campaign regarding the effort to recover Clinton’s missing 30,000 emails.

I-MR 61-62 has a discussion of Henry Oknyansky’s alleged effort to sell dirt on Clinton, promoted by Michael Caputo but concludes that information about the events was conflicted, that Alexei Rasin, who was claimed to have the information could not be found, and that the investigation could not determine the content or origin of the information. Therefore, the conclusion was that there was no evidence of a connection with Russia and this particular set of claimed dirt on Clinton. BUT this is largely inconclusive. There was much smoke but no fire could be found. As noted at outset by Mueller, the absence of evidence does not prove the absence of the fact in question.

I-MR 62-64 discusses Peter Smith’s efforts to locate the Clinton emails, including explicit claims of coordination with the Trump organization, including Flynn, Bannon and Kellyanne Conway. Mueller seems to raise the bar regarding what is probative evidence when he states that the investigation did not find evidence that any of the Trump people “initiated or directed” Smith’s work. If, for example, Bannon or Conway knew about Smith’s work and encouraged it without initiating or directing it, WHY would that not qualify as “coordination?” This is not explained. At I-MR 65, the ultimate conclusion was, in substance, that Smith had fabricated his claims of being in contact with the Russian hackers and that he had acquired the missing emails. But the key issue here is Trump Campaign coordination, not whether people like Smith were overstating what they knew.

 It has been suggested that all of this is just the work of a bunch of small-time hustlers trying to get in on the Trump action. https://bit.ly/2RWv1FT That may be true, but given that the control of the highest political office in the country was at stake, all of this smoke deserves the deepest scrutiny. The story here remains incomplete. Mueller elected to treat conflicted information as essentially neutral, giving equal weight to the “no coordination evidence.” This approach is not required in these circumstances and, given all the lying and withholding going on about the Russian connection throughout the Campaign, there is no apparent reason to treat conflicted evidence as neutral.

Mueller showed little interest in attempted conspiracy between Trump organization and Russia-connected individuals. For example, in fn 288 Mueller states that a Russian internet newspaper registered names for Trump2016.ru and DonaldTrump2016. Ru, then requested an interview by email to Hope Hicks. Mueller concludes this part of the narrative with “No interview took place.” Fine, BUT what was Hicks’ response to the email request and why is that not set out in the Report?

George Papadopoulos attended a March 31, 2016, meeting with Trump & Jeff Sessions, among others, and came away with impression that Trump, and possibly Sessions (some conflict re Sessions position) favored getting a meeting with Vladimir Putin. He pursued the idea through Joseph Mifsud and made many contacts with Russian-govt affiliated individuals. In the course of that work, he was told by Mifsud that the Russians had email dirt on Clinton. I-MR 89. On May 6, Papadopoulos told an unidentified representative of a foreign govt about the damaging emails that Russia wanted to use to hurt Clinton’s electoral chances. On July 26, 2016, after the WikiLeaks email dump, that foreign govt informed the FBI which then opened its investigation into Russian interference in the election.

At no time did Papadopoulos tell the FBI what he had learned. WHY was Papadopoulos not charged with aiding a foreign govt in defrauding the U.S.?? Papadopoulos was working for the Trump campaign at that time and had alerted the campaign about Russian interest in Trump. He believed that the Campaign wanted him to pursue the lead. What was the source of that belief? At the very least this should have been fully explained in the Report.

 Thru the spring/summer 2016, Papadopoulos kept Campaign officials aware of his efforts to arrange a meeting in Moscow with Putin thru emails to at least Lewandowski, Clovis (co-chair of Trump Campaign) and Manafort. I-MR 89. The Report barely mentions responses from any of these people. WHY?  Papadopoulos eventually suggested he personally could attend Russia meetings on behalf of the Campaign “off the record.” I-MR 90. This is an act of concealment, from which a reasonable inference can be drawn that the parties knew what they were doing was wrong.

Next: Campaign Officials Suffering from Failed Memories at Critical Times

[1] A military intelligence agency called the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, or GRU.